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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Automobiles - Guest Statute - Owner as Guest
in His Own Automobile
Owners, upon Defendant's request, permitted him to drive Own-
er's late model automobile so that Defendant could determine the
quality of that model car. While operating the vehicle, Defendant's
ordinarily negligent acts caused injury to the Owner and his car.
Defendant, in the suit which followed, moved for dismissal on the
ground that the Idaho guest statute' barred a claim based on ordinary
negligence. Held: Absent other facts indicating a different relation-
ship, the granting of a passenger's request to drive, as merely an act
of hospitality, is not sufficient to change an owner's status from
"host" to "guest." Peterson v. Winn, - Idaho -, 373 P.2d 925
(1962).
The common-law rule' requires an automobile driver to exercise
the care of an ordinary, responsible man for the safety of his guests.'
Most states have abrogated this rule by the enactment of statutes
relieving in varying degrees the owner or operator from liability for
injury or death.' Some statutes go to the extent of discharging the
owner or operator from all liability except willful or wanton mis-
conduct;' others from liability for all except intentional or intoxi-
cated acts;' and still others from liability for injuries due to ordinary
negligence.! The insurance industry fostered the enactment of these
statutes to prevent fraud and collusion, i.e., friendly suits, between
gratuitous guests in motor vehicles and their owners or operators!s
The feeling that the guest should not be permitted to repay his
host's hospitality with the institution of a law suit is a secondary
'Idaho Code Ann. S 49-1401 (1947) provides:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause for damages
against such owner or operator for injuries, death or loss, in case of accident,
unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner
or operator or caused by his intoxication or his reckless disregard of the rights
of others.
'2 Harper & James, Torts § 16.15 (1956).
a Comment, 14 Sw. L.J. 72 (1960).
4 Morrison & Arnold, Automobile Gucst Laws Today, 27 Ins. Counsel J. 223 (1960).
The author lists 30 states with guest laws. Id. at 223-25.
'Ala. Code tit. 36, § 95 (1959); Ark. Stat. §§ 75-913, -914 (1948); Ind. Ann. Stat.
55 47-1021, -1022 (1952).
6Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-9-1 (1953); Iowa Code S 321.494 (1949); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 41-9-1, -2 (1960).7 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 9.2102 (1960); S.C. Code § 46-801 (1962).
8 Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); Cedziwoda v. Crane-Longley
Funeral Chapel, 155 Tex. 99, 283 S.W.2d 217 (1955).
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reason.' Guest statutes are generally held constitutional if they do
not completely deny to an injured guest a claim against the owner
or operator of the automobile."
The question whether at the time of the injury there was a host-
guest relationship between the driver of an automobile and one riding
therein depends upon the provisions of the particular statute.1 Be-
cause the usual guest statute contains no definition of a "guest,"
determination of the guest status is left to judicial interpretation on
a case-by-case basis. 1 Whether one occupies the judicially defined
guest status is usually a question of fact for the jury." In the majority
of jurisdictions, a "guest" is one who is invited to enjoy the hos-
pitality of the driver and who accepts without making any return
or conferring any benefit upon the driver. 4 When the driver receives
a tangible benefit, monetary or otherwise, which is the motivating
influence for furnishing the transportation, the rider is a "pas-
senger."" The party asserting he is not a guest has the burden of
proof, " which cannot be discharged by showing the intangible and
vaguely defined benefits of hospitality, social relations, and com-
panionship.'
The instant case squarely presented for determination the question
whether an owner may be a "guest" while riding in his own auto-
mobile." Although less than a majority of the jurisdictions have
considered this problem, definite lines of authority have developed.
9 "The situation that guest statutes are designed to prevent is well known, the proverbial
ingratitude of the dog that bites the hand that feeds him." Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260,
263, 106 N.W.2d 643, 646 (1960). See also Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293
Pac. 841 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930).
'Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); Elkins v. Foster, 101
S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
"Nemoitin v. Berger, 111 Conn. 88, 149 Atl. 233 (1930).
"Comment, 14 Sw. L.J. 72 (1960); Comment, 3 Wyo. L.J. 225 (1949).
'a Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C. 260, 34 S.E.2d 185 (1945).
'
4 Buffat v. Schnuckle, 79 Idaho 314, 316 P.2d 887 (1957); Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8
App. Div. 2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1959); Linn v. Noted, 133 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) error dism. judgm. cor.; 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399(5), at 1009 (1949).
"Ray v. Hanisch, 147 Cal. App. 2d 742, 306 P.2d 30 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Raub v.
Rowe, 119 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism. judgm. cor.
"6Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955); In re Wright's
Estate, 170 Kan. 660, 228 P.2d 911 (1951); Webb v. Huffman, 320 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n,r.e.
17 Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 106 N.W.2d 643 (1960). Sharing the expenses of
the trip, i.e., paying a share of the gasoline and oil used, fall within this category, and are
not such compensation as will remove a person from the status of guest. Morgan v. Tour-
angeau, 259 Mich. 598, 244 N.W. 173 (1932); Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.
2d 533 (1958). See also 155 A.L.R. 576 (1945).
"Suits seeking property damage from a person who borrowed the owner's car and then
wrecked it while the owner was not present do not fall within the guest statute. This class
of suits is excluded by wording such as in the Idaho Guest Statute, Idaho Code Ann. §
49-1401 (1947): "No person transported .. .shall have a cause ...." (Emphasis added.)
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One view, best exemplified by the case of Phelps v. Benson," holds
that the owner may be a guest when riding in his own automobile.
This construction is usually given by states which liberally construe
statutes in derogation of the common law in order to effectuate the
legislative intent." These courts conclude that the guest statute is
designed to thwart collusive litigation when the real party-defendant
is an insurance company.' At least one case holding that the owner
may be a guest has applied a rebuttable presumption that an oc-
cupant riding in a car operated by another person is a guest and has
the burden of proving otherwise."
The case of Gledhill v. Connecticut Co.2 3 represents another con-
siderable body of authority which holds that guest statutes, which
derogate from the common law, should be strictly interpreted. 4
Under this view the statute is construed against the owner or
operator to allow recovery by the injured occupant for ordinary
negligence. The court in Gledhill relied upon the dictionary defini-
tion of the word "guest'"  and upon the legislative policy of pre-
venting actions by the recipients of a host's hospitality." Those states
which follow Gledhill2" do not quarrel with the definition given the
term "guest" by those states following Phelps,"8 since the former have
" 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958). When two couples travel together in an
automobile owned by one for the mutual pleasure of all, the mere fact of ownership does
not prevent the owner from being a guest of the operator.
"°See Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); Phelps v. Benson, 252
Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958).
25Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941).
22Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 106 N.W.2d 643 (1960). For other cases holding
that the owner may be a guest, see Sackett v. Haeckel, 249 Minn. 290, 81 N.W.2d 833
(1957); Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943);
Gorman v. Bratka, 139 Neb. 718, 298 N.W. 691 (1941); Willis v. Fitzgerald Bros. Brewing
Co., 176 Misc. 197, 25 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 1941); Herzog v. Mittleman, 155 Ore.
624, 65 P.2d 384 (1937); Schweidler v. Caruso, 269 Wis. 438, 69 N.W.2d 611 (1955).
Although not within the typical guest statute, in cases in which the question is the liability
of the guest for injury to a third person due primarily to the negligence of the driver, it
is generally conceded that the owner may be considered as a guest. See, e.g., Reiter v. Grober,
173 Wis. 493, 181 N.W. 739 (1921). See also 18 A.L.R. 362 (1922).
2a 121 Conn. 102, 183 Atl. 379 (1936). The Connecticut Guest Statute was repealed
by omission in the 1949 statute revision.
24 See Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940); McCann v. Hoffman, 9
Cal. 2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937); Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal. App. 2d 43, 127 P.2d 292
(Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Smith v. Clute, 277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E.2d 455 (1938).
25A guest is "a person to whom the hospitality of a home, club, etc., is extended." 121
Conn. at 105, 183 Atl. at 380.
20 121 Conn. at 107, 183 Atl. at 382.
21 See Richard v. Evans, 273 Ala. 120, 135 So. 2d 384 (1961); Ahlgren v. Ahlgren,
313 P.2d 88 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Collie v. Aust, 342 P.2d 998 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1959); Thomas v. Hughes, 177 Kan. 347, 279 P.2d 286 (1955).
2" Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958); Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa
260, 106 N.W.2d 643 (1960).
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now expanded the definition of that term. However, the important
distinction of strict and liberal construction of statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law remains."0 Most of these courts recognize
a presumption or inference that the owner of a vehicle, though riding
in it, retains the right to direct and control the driver. 1 The in-
fluence of the inference undoubtedly varies with the circumstances
but is strongest when the operator is the wife or child3' of the
owner-passenger; it is weakest when the facts show that the owner
has loaned his car and is riding with the borrower." Some courts take
the view that the owner's retained right of control is inconsistent
with his guest status."
A third, and more recent, line of cases holds that the owner may
or may not be a guest, depending upon the facts and circumstances
of each case." The instant case falls within this group. These cases
first consider the nature of the relationship between the parties at
the outset of the journey, and when the status does not change, the
host-guest relationship will be respected, regardless of the actual
position of the parties in the automobile. To determine who is the
guest, the courts examine the relationship to find who is receiving
the benefit. If the owner by permitting another to drive receives
-no other benefit, he is not relegated to the position of guest.
The tack which will be taken by those courts which have not
been presented with the problem is difficult to predict. However,
foreseeability is enhanced by determining whether the jurisdiction
gives statutes in derogation of the common law a strict or liberal
construction. This approach is not without difficulty, since the guest
statute must be construed to effect the purpose sought to be ac-
complished." In jurisdictions where the policy of the legislature is to
29 Wilson v. Workman, 192 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1961); Lorch v. Elgin, 369 Pa. 314,
85 A.2d 841 (1952).
3'The distinction was drawn in Henline v. Wilson, 174 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1960), in which that court, in a strict construction jurisdiction, said: "Should we
adopt a liberal construction we would probably find that the owner was a guest since he
was really enjoying the hospitality of the driver."
3' Grover v. Sharp & Fellows Contracting Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 736, 153 P.2d 83 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1944); Beam v. Pittsburgh Rys., 366 Pa. 360, 77 A.2d 634 (1951).
"Cowart v. Lewis, 151 Miss. 221, 117 So. 531 (1920).
"Smith v. Spirek, 196 Iowa 1328, 195 N.W. 736 (1923).
34 Ray v. Hanisch, 147 Cal. App. 2d 742, 306 P.2d 30 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
"1See Helms v. Leonard, 170 F. Supp. 143 (D. Va. 1959), aff'd, 269 F.2d 48 (4th Cir.
1959); Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div. 2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1959).
36 Helms v. Leonard, subra note 3 5. However, some cases have held that a person initially
a guest remains a guest despite his subsequent conduct. See Atkins v. Hemphill, 33 Wash. 2d
735, 207 P.2d 195 (1949).
"Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div. 2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1959).
'"Note, 38 Texas L. Rev. 110 (1960).
3" Gregory v. Otts, 329 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.
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prevent collusive suits, if the owner is allowed to sue his driver, the
possibility of collusion is equally as great as when the guest sues the
host.4 The general tort rule that a volunteer, i.e., the guest who
assumes the position of driver, will be liable for ordinary negligence
in rendering aid to another if he does so negligently, no matter how
good his intentions may be-the "officious intermeddler" doctrine4-
can have no application in jurisdictions where the legislative policy
is to prevent suits by a recipient of a host's hospitality. The best
approach, evidenced by the instant case, ignores technicalities based
upon strict or liberal construction of the statute and the consequences
of adopting one definition of guest as opposed to another' and places
the decision solely upon the facts of each case. Although, under this
view, the result of a particular case cannot always be predicted, the
court is free to dispense justice as required by the specific circum-
stances and to give effect to legislative policy. Under this rule the
owner may be brought within the guest statute by a showing that
the motivation for the trip was the conferring of a definite tangible
benefit upon him.4" Should the courts refuse to permit an owner
to be a guest in a proper case, it is probable that either remedial
legislation will be enacted" or that insurance companies will raise
their rates to compensate for the new losses.4"
W. Wiley Doran
40 Note, 37 Neb. L. Rev. 467 (1958). However, since most modern automobile insurance
policies extend coverage to whoever is driving, the question of ownership is immaterial
insofar as liability of the insurance company is concerned. Note, 32 So. Cal. L. Rev. 93
(1959).
4'Gates v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 185 Ky. 24, 213 S.W. 564 (1919); Dunham v.
Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952). See also Prosser, Torts § 38
(2d ed. 1955).
4 In jurisdictions which use a dictionary definition of "guest," viz., a person to whom
the hospitality of a home, club, etc. is extended, the owner could never be a guest in his
own car since it would require that he be the recipient of his own hospitality. See Note,
4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 652 (1957).
41 See Note, 9 Baylor L. Rev. 238 (1957).
44 See, e.g., Cal. Vehicle Code § 17158. See also Note, 37 Neb. L. Rev. 467 (1958).
"5 Texas courts have not been called upon to consider whether the owner may be a guest.
The Texas statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701(b) (1960), was passed in 1931
and was derived from the Connecticut statute, former Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1628
(1930), which was repealed in 1949 by omission from the 1949 revision of the General
Statutes of Connecticut. The Texas statute provides, in substance, that a guest may recover
only if his injury was caused by the host's intentional act or by his heedlessness or reckless
disregard of the rights of others. A Texas court has indicated that the Texas guest statute
should be construed in the light of Connecticut decisions before the enactment of the
Texas statute. Johnson v. Smither, 116 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.
Therefore, if the Gledhill case (see note 23 sulra) were followed, Texas might hold that
the owner is not a guest. Further, reliance upon the dictionary definition of guest has
precedent in Texas. McClain v. Carter, 278 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.
n.r.e. But, unlike Connecticut, Texas is required by specific statutory authority to construe
statutes in derogation of the common law liberally. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 10,
S 8 (1948). But see Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 137 S.W.
1120 (1911); Silurian Oil Co. v. White, 252 S.W. 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) error ref.,
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Choice-of-Law - Multi-State Torts Under Federal Tort
Claims Act - Application of Entire Substantive Law
of State Where Act or Omission Occurred
A scheduled commercial airliner, bound from Oklahoma to New
York, crashed in Missouri. Plaintiffs, legal representatives and sur-
vivors of the passengers and crew, sued the United States in the
federal district court sitting in Oklahoma. The complaint alleged
that an agent of the Civil Aeronautics Agency in Tulsa, Oklahoma,
had violated provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act and the cor-
responding regulations' and that such failure rendered the United
States liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act' and the Oklahoma
Wrongful Death Act.' Prior to the institution of the suit, each of
the plaintiffs had received or had been tendered a settlement of
15,000 dollars from the airline, the maximum recovery allowed
under the Missouri Wrongful Death Act.' The district court dis-
missed the suit, holding, inter alia, that if Oklahoma law were
applicable under the Tort Claims Act, then the entire law of Okla-
homa, including its choice-of-law rules, was applicable. Further re-
covery was thus denied since the Oklahoma choice-of-law rules
would apply the law of Missouri, the place where the negligence had
its operative effect." A majority' of the court of appeals upheld the
where statutes were strictly construed. Therefore, a decision following the Phelps rule,
holding that the owner is a guest, is not beyond possibility. It is submitted that the Texas
courts should not adopt a hard and fast rule classifying the owner as guest or otherwise,
but should, in accordance with the theory of the instant case, let each case turn upon its
specific facts.
'Plaintiffs alleged that the crash was caused by a fire in one of the engines which, in
turn, resulted from the failure of a defective and unairworthy cylinder which had been
installed in the overhaul depot. Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 72 Stat. 778, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1425 (1958), the administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency is responsible for the
enforcement of rules and regulations controlling inspection, maintenance, overhaul, and
repair of all equipment used in air transportation.
' Provisions of the Tort Claims Act are found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504,
2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1958). The pertinent provisions, §§ 1346 and
2674 are quoted in notes 16, 17 infra. Citations to relevant U.S.C. sections are hereafter
referred to as sections of the "Tort Claims Act."
'Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 1051-54 (1961). Oklahoma has no limitation on recovery
from a tortfeasor in a wrongful death action.
4 The United States filed a third party complaint against the airline, seeking reimburse-
ment for any amount plaintiffs might recover from the government.
'At the time of this suit, maximum recovery was determined by Mo. Ann. Stat. 5
537.090 (1949), subsequently amended to allow a maximum recovery of $25,000, Mo.
Ann. Stat. S 537.090 (1962).
8 The district court alternatively ruled that the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Act could
not be applied extra-territorially when a negligent act or omission occurred in Oklahoma
and the injury in Missouri.
'See Gochenour v. St. Louis S.F. Ry., 205 Okla. 594, 239 P.2d 769, 771 (1959); Miller
v. Tennis, 140 Okla. 185, 282 Pac. 345, 348 (1929).
'285 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1960).
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decision! On certiorari,"° held, affirmed: The entire law, including
choice-of law rules, of the jurisdiction where a negligent act or omis-
sion occurs is to be applied in multi-state torts arising under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1
(1962).
As a general choice-of-law or conflict-of-laws rule, tort liability
is governed by the law of the place of injury, when the act or omis-
sion and the injury occur in different jurisdictions." The rule applies
regardless of the forum." However, only those foreign laws which
are classified as "substantive" will be applied by the forum where
the action is tried; the forum will use its own "procedural" rules."
Although agreeing that the "place of the wrong" generally governs,
some courts have held that such place is determined by where the
wrongful act or omission occurred, rather than where the injury
resulted."
The Tort Claims Act was designed to remove sovereign immunity
from the United States and, with certain exceptions, to render it
liable for its torts." Section 1346(b) of the Tort Claims Act equates
the liability of the federal government with that of a private person
"in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."'" According to section 2674, the liability of the United
' Id. at 526. Chief Judge Murrah dissented, urging that only the internal law of Okla-
homa was applicable and that it was error to apply the Oklahoma choice-of-law rules.
10366 U.S. 916 (1961).
"Alabama G.S.R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892); Cameron v. Vandegriff,
53 Ark. 381, 13 S.W. 1092 (1890); Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 377-78 (1934). See
also 77 A.L.R.2d 1266 (1961). To illustrate the general rule, suppose D standing in state
X throws a rock which strikes and injures P who is standing in state Y. P's substantive
rights are determined by the law of the place of the injury, viz., state Y.
"2 Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940). The general rule has been
applied to airline crashes similar to the one involved in the principal case; however, the
United States was not a party. See Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 457, 199
N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Faron v. Eastern Airlines, 193 Misc. 395, 84 N.Y.S.2d
568 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
"Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 7, 584-85 (1934).
14Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Haums-
child v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). See also Grant v.
McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). Several writers have critically reviewed
the definition of the "place of the wrong" concept which underlies the general rule. See,
e.g., Cook, Tort Liability and Conflict of Laws, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 202 (1935); Ehrenzweig,
The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restate-
ment, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1951); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method
of Case Law, 19 Tul. L. Rev. 4, 165 (1944).
"5See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), for a detailed analysis of the pur-
poses of the Tort Claims Act.
'"28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958) provides:
District courts .. .shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages . .. for injury or loss of prop-
erty, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
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States shall be determined "in the same manner and to the same
extent as that of a private individual under like circumstances." 7
It has been determined that any interpretation of section 1346(b)
must be made only in the light of the express wording of section
2674, since the sections must be read in pari materia."
Literally interpreted, section 1346(b), when it speaks of the law
of the jurisdiction in which the act or omission occurs, sets forth a
basis for determining the rights of parties to a multi-state tort action
contrary to the general choice-of-law rule, which applies the law
of the place of injury." However, the legislative history of the choice-
of-law provision of the Tort Claims Act does not conclusively sub-
stantiate a literal interpretation." The language of section 1346(b),
"where the act or omission occurred," is also found in the venue pro-
vision of the Tort Claims Act." Assistant Attorney-General Shea,
while testifying at the time of its adoption, was asked where a claim-
ant under the Tort Claims Act could bring his suit. He answered,
"either where the claimant resides, or in the locale of the injury or
damage."" (Emphasis added.) If the words "act or omission" in the
venue provision referred to the place where the claimant was injured
or damaged, then the identical words found in section 1346 (b) might
have been given the same construction. 3 However, the majority of
cases decided prior to the instant case had not so held. 4
Three distinct interpretations of the language in sections 1346(b)
and 2674 developed in the courts of appeal faced with multi-state
tort claims. One view applied the law of the jurisdiction where the
negligent act or omission had its operative effect." The other two
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.
1728 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958) provides: "The United States shall be liable, respecting
* tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances ... "
" Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957). See also United States v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1960); Reviser's Notes following
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1946); S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1946).
" See authorities cited note 11 supra.
"Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Committee on the judici-
ary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1946); 69
Cong. Rec. 2192-93, 3118 (1928); 86 Cong. Rec. 12024 (1940).
" The venue provision of the act provides that suit may be brought "where the plaintiff
resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred." 28 U.S.C. S 1402(b)
(1958).
"Hearings, op. cit. supra note 20, at 9, 29, 30.
"See United States v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 80-81 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 350
U.S. 907 (1955).
'" Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1958); United States v. Union Trust
Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955); Landon v. United States,
197 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1952); cf. United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1956).
as See United States v. Marshall, supra note 24.
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views were commonly known as the "internal law"2 and the "sub-
stantive law" '27 approaches and were similar in that both rationales
applied the law of the jurisdiction where the negligent act or omission
occurred in order to determine the rights of the litigants. However,
the "internal law" rationale excluded application of any choice-of-
law rules, while the "substantive law" interpretation applied the
entire law, including any choice-of-law rules, of the state where the
act or omission occurred.
Those courts applying the internal law of the jurisdiction where
the negligent act had its operative effect relied upon the general
choice-of-law rule and Shea's testimony to support their theory."
However, the decisions of a majority of appellate courts" have con-
strued section 1346(b) to mean that Congress made a deliberate
choice of words and intended to effectuate a basis contrary to the
general choice-of-law rule for determining liability, thus giving rise
to the "internal law" and "substantive law" theories. Both of the
latter two theories were reasonable constructions of the explicit
language found in section 1346 (b), i.e., "law of the place where the
act or omission occurred." However, the "substantive law" interpre-
tation generally2" permitted the courts to give meaning to section
2674, viz., that the liability of the United States should be deter-
mined "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private in-
dividual under like circumstances." Moreover, it had been determined
that Congress did not intend to impose a distinct federal rule for
determining the liability of the United States under the Tort Claims
Act but meant to judge government liability by the same standards
that are used to determine an individual's liability, namely, the local
or state law."
In the instant case, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court,
distinguished the venue provision 2 and section 1346(b). He stated
that Shea's testimony "bears no relation to the choice-of-law prob-
lems, and ...the considerations underlying the problem of venue
are substantially different from those determining applicable law.
... [Therefore,] we are not persuaded to allow an isolated piece
of legislative history to detract from the Act the words Congress
26 See, e.g., United States v. Union Trust Co., 211 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 350 U.S.
907 (1955).
27 See, e.g., Landon v. United States, 197 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1952).
26United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1956).
"'Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1958); United States v. Union
Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955); Landon v. United States,
197 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1952); cf. United States v. Marshall, supra note 28.
3°See note 39 infra.
sFeres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950).
2 2 8 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1958).
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expressly employed."'" Choosing not to accept the internal law of
the place where the negligence had its operative effect as a suitable
construction of "act or omission" in section 1346(b), ' the Court
passed to the choice between the "internal law" and "substantive
law" interpretations. In so doing, the Court looked to the provisions
of the entire Tort Claims Act "and to its object and policy.""5 The
Court refused to "assume that Congress intended to set the courts
completely adrift from state law with regard to questions for which
it . . . [had] not provided a specific and definite answer in an act
such as the ... [Tort Claims Act] which ... is so intimately related
to state law.""0 Consequently, the "substantive law" approach was
adopted. 7
The underlying purpose of the Tort Claims Act is evident; it is
also clear that Congress did not intend to create an entirely distinct
system of federal liability. 5 Thus, the "substantive law" approach
better satisfies the purpose of the act, since under that theory federal
courts can generally treat the United States as a private individual
in like circumstances. The "internal law" rationale is inconsistent
with this philosophy because it extends limitations upon how much
state law will be applied without regard to the state's particular
policy or precedent. As a practical matter, the discarded "internal
law" and "law of the place of injury" rationales did not provide
the flexibility of application necessary in multi-state tort claims.
The "substantive law" rationale is the more desirable since its ap-
plication is in accord with the policy, as found in the choice-of-law
rules, of the state where the act or omission occurs. If the plaintiffs
had sued both the United States and the airline in the Richards
case, the construction adopted would have determined the liability
of the United States "in the same manner and to the same extent as
3 369 U.S. at 9-10 n.20.
3Id. at 10.
'
5 id. at 11.
30 Ibid.
"T It has been suggested that the Court has utilized the technique of renvoi in adopting
the "substantive law" approach. See In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d
652 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In re Zietz Estate, 198 Misc. 77, 96 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Surr. Ct. 1950);
University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936) for applications of
this principle. However, the writer feels renvoi is not present in the Richards case since
Missouri "internal law" determines liability without reference to the Missouri choice-of-law
rule. Use of the latter rule would result in an endless stacking of conflicts rules before a
decision is reached-seemingly the situation when the technique of renvoi would be present.
" The instant case represents a situation in which the Tort Claims Act creates a cause
of action against the United States, and the issue of applicable law is controlled by the
language expressed in the statute, as construed by the Court. See 369 U.S. at 7. This must
be distinguished from a situation in which federal jurisdiction arises from diversity of
citizenship. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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a private individual under like circumstances."" The decision does
not create new problems of "forum shopping," because the federal
district court of the forum state must apply the entire substantive
law of the jurisdiction where the act or omission occurred, including
the choice-of-law rules. The rule adopted by the Supreme Court will
continue to allow states to determine liability according to established
and familiar rules for torts committed entirely within a state, yet
it also provides a flexible rule which will apply local policy as ex-
pressed in the state's choice-of-law rules in the handling of multi-
state tort claims.
Donald Lucas
Constitutional Law - Eminent Domain -
Taking of Land by a Nuisance
Plaintiff-homeowners sued the United States under the Tucker
Act1 and under the fifth amendment ' for damages which arose from
an alleged taking of their property by the United States Air Force.
Following the acquisition of Plaintiffs' homes, an Air Force base
nearby had been enlarged to accommodate jet aircraft, which sub-
sequently had caused smoke, oily deposits, noise, and strong vibra-
tions to be visited upon Homeowners' properties. Plaintiffs did not
allege or prove that the aircraft flew directly over the property but
contended only that the nuisance constituted a "taking" without
compensation since it caused actual physical damage to their property
as well as substantial interference with the normal incidents of use
and enjoyment. Held: Noise, vibrations, and smoke which interfere
with the use and enjoyment of property without a physical invasion
of the property itself do not constitute a compensable taking under
the fifth amendment. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
'9 Jurisdiction over the airline would arise from diversity. The federal court sitting in
Oklahoma would then apply Oklahoma substantive law under the "Erie doctrine," hence,
also determining the airline's liability by Missouri law. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The "internal law" rationale would determine the
liability of the United States by Oklahoma law and the airline's liability by Missouri law.
However, the venue provision of the Tort Claims Act allows suit to be brought where
all the plaintiffs reside or where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1958).
See also Knecht v. United States, 242 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1957); Olson v. United States,
175 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1949). Therefore, situations can arise when the liability of the
United States and that of a private individual will not be determined in the same manner.
'28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) (1958). The Tucker Act provides that an action may be
maintained against the United States for a claim "founded . . . upon the Constitution . . .
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States."




Not every governmental interference which adversely affects a
private economic interest amounts to a constitutional taking.3 Unlike
many state constitutions which provide for payment when property
has been taken or damaged as a result of the exercise of the power of
eminent domain,4 the federal constitution provides for compensa-
tion only in the case of a taking of private property for public use.'
However, what constitutes a compensable taking cannot be defined
precisely! It was early recognized that the term "property" con-
sisted of both the corporeal interest itself and certain rights in and
over the land.' From this it was reasoned that a deprivation of those
rights was equivalent to a use of the property itself and, hence, a
"taking" in the constitutional sense.8 However, by limiting the
words "taken" and "property" to their "obvious and popular mean-
ing, ' courts found a "taking" only in cases in which property was
actually seized, rather than in those in which property was merely
injured by non-dispossessory acts."0 As a result, throughout much of
the nineteenth century mere damage, without a trespass, was not
recognized under the fifth amendment."
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, "the obvious unfair-
ness to property owners . . .. began to influence the courts. In the
leading case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,"3 the Supreme Court said:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing
a provision of constitutional law, . . . [it should] be held that if the
'United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Portsmouth Harbor Land
& Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765
(10th Cir. 1953); Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
'In 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain 324-25 (3d ed. 1950), there is a list of 25 state
constitutions which provide, in substance, that private property shall not be publicly taken
or damaged without compensation.
'Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir. 1953). See also U.S. Const.
amend. V, quoted note 2 suspra; United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499
(1945); Sharpe v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 (1903); Stephenson Brick Co. v. United
States, 110 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1940).
6 Harris v. United States, supra note 5.
rI Lewis, Eminent Domain 52 (3d ed. 1909); cf. 3 Bentham, Works 182 (1943 ed.).
Nichols states that the word "property' "has been used with reference to the corporeal
object which is the subject of ownership, and it has been used to indicate the aggregate
rights which an owner possesses in or with respect to such corporeal object." 2 Nichols,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 2.
81 Lewis, op. cit. suspra note 7, at 56.
'Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 274 (1897). See also Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380 (1893).
'1 Gibson v. United States, supra note 9.
"1 Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48 Va. L.
Rev. 437, 442 (1962). See also Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept,
42 Calif. L. Rev. 596, 599 (1954).
"Spies & McCoid, suispra note 11, at 442.
1a 8 0 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
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government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to
the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict ir-
reparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject
it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in
the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.14
Though the case represented a departure from the strict interpreta-
tion of "taking,"'5 the opinion still required physical invasion of the
land." It was some time before courts awarded compensation for
a "taking" which consisted only of consequential damages to prop-
erty." In Bedford v. United States," the Court emphasized that the
distinction between mere damages as a result of a taking and an
actual taking itself had to be observed in applying the constitu-
tional provision.'9 Subsequent cases continued to elaborate upon this
dichotomy."
The prevailing view today appears to be that any substantial inter-
ference which destroys or lessens the value of private property or
the rights or enjoyment incidental to such property is, in fact and
in law, a "taking" in the constitutional sense, even though title and
possession of the owner remain undisturbed." The eminent domain
provision of the constitution is thought to be addressed to every
sort of interest a citizen possesses." As the Supreme Court stated in
United States v. Causby,"3 ". . . it is the owner's loss, not the taker's
gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken."4 How-
ever, this rule is modified by its corollary that consequential damages"
14 id. at 177.
" See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917), in which the Court held there
were constitutional takings although the government had not directly appropriated the
title, possession, or use of the properties. See also United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445
(1903).
"See Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L.J. 221, 235
(1931).
" See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924); Bothwell v. United States,
254 U.S. 231 (1920); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); Mani-
gault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905); Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904);
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878). See also 1 Lewis, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 445-46.
'8192 U.S. 217 (1904).
19 Id. at 224.
"See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), 16 Sw. L.J. 346 (1962);
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914);
Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953).
" 2 Nichols, op. cit. supra note 4, at 259.
"5 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947). See also Bartholomae Corp. v.
United States, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957).
13328 U.S. 256 (1946).
24Id. at 261.
"Consequential damages are harmful effects to property not actually taken or entered
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are damnum absque injuria and not compensable, 8 except in cases
of severe interference equivalent to a deprivation of the use or
enjoyment of property27 which amounts to the imposition of a
servitude."8
Unlike the situation in Causby where there had been continuous
invasions of the airspace above the landowner, 9 Homeowners in the
instant case did not allege that the flights were made over their
property but contended that the noise, vibration, and smoke alone
were sufficient to amount to a taking under the Constitution.2
Nevertheless, the trial court" considered Causby a controlling pre-
cedent and held that since there was no trespass over the property,
there was no taking which required compensation."2 The majority of
the Tenth Circuit likewise rejected Homeowners' argument, noted
the regular flights over the property in Causby and similar cases,"
and held that absent such physical invasion, recovery had been uni-
formly denied. 4 The disturbance here was said to be merely a
neighborhood inconvenience. 2 The weakness of this reasoning is that
in Causby, even though the Court held that overhead flights were
a necessary ingredient for recovery, the language employed"8 clearly
indicated that it was not the overhead flights that constituted the
taking but the noise and interference with the enjoyment and use
of the land. 7 By relying upon that portion of Causby that required
the overhead flights, the Tenth Circuit harked back to the old
physical interpretation of "taking."'" As a result the land owners'
rights to recover continue to be unnecessarily restricted (1) because
of the inadequacy of tort actions when the damage is the incidental
result of a non-trespassory act, and (2) because it appears from
but injured as a natural result of an act lawfully done by another. 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain
§ 111 (1941).
282 Nichols, op. cit. supra note 4, at 339.
27Id. at 343.
21 Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922). See
also United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947); Yazel v. United States, 93
F. Supp. 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
28 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
"'See the court of appeals opinion, 306 F.2d at 584.
21 The lower court's opinion was not reported. See 306 F.2d at 582-83 for portions of
that court's findings.
32 id. at 582.
33 d. at 584; cf. Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957);
Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958).
34 306 F.2d at 585.
3' Id. at 586.
"8The Court stated in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), that: "Flights
over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct
and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Id. at 266.
3 Id. at 269.
28 See text accompanying notes 9, 10 supra.
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Causby that flights above 500 feet are beyond the reach of the land-
owner and his objections about interference with his property rights, "
since the space over one's property above that height is in the public
domain.4
The usefulness of air transportation warrants that its development
be not limited by old concepts of property rights, yet fairness re-
quires that those injured be reasonably compensated for operations
that immediately and directly limit the exploitation of their proper-
ties.4' Chief Judge Murrah, in his dissent: in the principal case,
recognized the need for protecting the property owner and said
that the test should be whether the interference is sufficiently direct
and peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude to require, in the interest
of justice, that the burden imposed be borne by the public rather
than by the individual. 3 In rejecting that test and in failing to
set forth clearly a test of their own, the majority of the Tenth Circuit
left in doubt exactly when, if ever, interference with a protectable
property right will constitute a compensable taking." Previous cases
in this area are confusing and of little help.4" As a result, there is no
clear indication of the theory underlying suits against the federal
government for such "takings.""
Now is the time for a re-evaluation of the principles and policies
which have produced this result. ' Since considerations of public
policy should control," Congressional legislation is needed.4' How-
ever, until Congress furnishes the necessary relief, the courts should
3" Cf. Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283, 286 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
"'Navigable airspace means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed
by regulations issued under this chapter, and shall include airspace needed to insure safety
in take-off and landing of aircraft." 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. S 1301 (24) (Supp. IV, 1962).
Civil Air Regulation S 60.17 provides: "Except when necessary for take-off or landing, no
person shall operate an aircraft below the following altitudes: 1000 feet over congested
areas and 500 feet over other than congested areas." 14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1956).
41 Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959). Compare Spies & McCoid,
supra note 11, at 451.
42 306 F.2d at 586.
4aId. at 588.
"The majority stated: " . . [T]hese disturbing conditions . . . do not effect an
actual displacement of a landowner. . . . The damages are no more than a consequence of
the operations of the Base. ... 306 F.2d at 585. (Emphasis added.)
41 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1923); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S.
327 (1922); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166
(1871); Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932); Freeman v.
United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958).
"'See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947).
47 See Spies & McCoid, supra note 11, at 449.
48 Cormack, supra note 16, at 259.
4Cf. Spies & McCoid, supra note 11, at 456. See also United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
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recognize that the rights of ownership include the right to reasonable
use and enjoyment as well as the corporeal rights incident to prop-
erty ownership and that when there is a violation of any of these
rights, property is "taken." ' Problems caused by technological ad-
vances cannot be solved by the application of rigid constitutional
restraints formulated and enforced by courts," but only by the
adaptation of the law to the economic and social needs of the times."
The ever-increasing demands of modern transportation must be met
for the good of society, yet there is no reason to place the brunt of
the expense on those few unfortunate individuals who suffer direct
property loss because of this expansion. The test enunciated by Chief
Judge Murrah" would provide a logical and workable method of
solving the problem. Under that rule, each case would, as it should,
be weighed on its individual facts and compensation meted out as
justice requires. As it stands, the principal case permits technicalities
to override realities and should not be followed.
Fred Kolodey
Constitutional Law - Justiciable Controversy -
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Judicial Restraint
Connecticut's penal statutes prohibit the use of contraceptive de-
vices and the giving of medical advice in the use of such devices.'
Appellants, a married couple and a married woman, after medical
determination that another pregnancy would be injurious to the
50 Cormack, supra note 16, at 259.
51 See dissent in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 274 (1946).
"Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
53 See text accompanying note 42 supra. In the recent case of Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, - Ore - 376 P.2d 100 (1962), the Oregon Supreme Court recognized that
Chief Judge Murrah's dissenting opinion was the better-reasoned analysis of the legal
principles involved and added, "It is sterile formality to say that the government takes an
easement in private property when it repeatedly sends aircraft directly over the land, ...
but does not take an easement when it sends aircraft a few feet to the right or left of
the perpendicular boundaries [of such land]." Id. at 109.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-32 (1958):
Use of drugs or instruments to prevent conception. Any person who uses any
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days
nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.
The Connecticut statute specifically outlaws only the use of contraceptive devices. The
sale or distribution of such devices and the giving of information concerning their use are
forbidden on the basis of the state's general accessory law, Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 54-196
(1958): "Accessories. Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands
another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender." See State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940).
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health or life of the women,2 sought a declaratory judgment that the
statute deprived them of life and liberty without due process of law.
Appellants' physician,' alleging identical facts, contended that the
statute prevented him from prescribing proper medical treatment4
and hence deprived him of liberty and property without due process
of law. Appellee, the state's attorney, admitted that, in the course
of his public duty, he intended to prosecute offenses against Con-
necticut law and that the use of and advice concerning contraceptives
would constitute offenses. s There was no evidence presented that the
state had ever attempted to enforce the statute through criminal
prosecution of spouses! Held, dismissed: A state penal statute, which
has never been enforced and in all likelihood never will be enforced,
presents no realistic threat of prosecution and thus no justiciable
controversy in a declaratory judgment action challenging the statute
as unconstitutional. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked only under
circumstances constituting a "case" or "controversy" within the
2 Appellant Jane Doe, during a recent pregnancy, had developed a severe heart condition
resulting in a cerebral hemorrhage. She was unconscious for two weeks and acutely ill for
nine weeks during the pregnancy. After spontaneously delivering a still born fetus, Mrs. Doe
was left with paralysis of the right leg and right arm, residual kidney damage, marked
impairment of speech and serious emotional damage. The opinion of Mrs. Doe's physician
was that another pregnancy would be exceedingly perilous to her life. Brief for Appellants,
p. 5.
Appellant Pauline Poe had undergone three consecutive pregnancies terminating in the
delivery of infants with multiple congenital abnormalities from which each died shortly
after birth. Mrs. Poe suffered great emotional distress as a result of the successive tragedies,
and her physician, who also treated Mrs. Doe, was of the opinion that another pregnancy
would be extremely disturbing to her physical and mental health. Brief for Appellants,
pp. 6-7.
Appellants were suing under fictitious names as approved by the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors because of the special circumstances of the case.
a The physician, Dr. C. Lee Buxton, was a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology. He
was formerly a professor in these specialties at the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center
in New York and at the time of the suit was Professor and Chairman of the Department
of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Yale University School of Medicine and the Grace-New
Haven Community Hospital. Brief for Appellants, p. 7.
4 Dr. Buxton's medical opinion was that the best and safest treatment for the two
patients, Appellants Jane Doe and Pauline Poe, was the prescription by him and use by
them of devices or instruments to prevent conception and future pregnancies. He contended
that he was unable to administer such treatment and advice for the sole reason that Ap-
pellee, the state's attorney, claimed that the giving of such advice and treatment and the
use of such instruments by the patients were prohibited by the Connecticut statutes, and
that he would prosecute any violations of such statutes. Brief for Appellants, p. 7.
' The admission was by demurrer to Appellants' complaint. Appellee's brief did not
even discuss justiciability.
o The Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives has been in effect since
1879. Since that time there was but one recorded case dealing with a prosecution under
the statute. In that case, State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940), the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut sustained the constitutionality of the statute as applied
against two doctors and a nurse who had allegedly disseminated contraceptive information
at a birth control clinic.
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meaning of Article III of the Constitution.' Thus the Court has no
authority to pronounce an abstract opinion upon the constitution-
ality of a state statute!s This is not, however, the sole limitation upon
the Court's exercise of judicial power, particularly in cases involving
constitutional issues. In addition, "the Court [has] developed, for
its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction,
a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part
of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision."'
Through the years these self-restraining rules have manifested the
reluctance, even refusal, of the Court to undertake this most im-
portant and delicate function until it was compelled to do so, in
the course of its constitutional duty, by litigants who actively as-
serted interests and rights in controversies which demanded immediate
resolution."
The Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives was
first enacted in 1879." Since that time there had been no recorded
'Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). "The term 'controversies,' if dis-
tinguishable at all from 'cases,' is so in that it is less comprehensive than the latter and
includes only suits of a civil nature." Id. at 356, adopting Mr. Justice Field's definition
in the case of In re Pacific Ry. Comm., 32 Fed. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
s Muskrat v. United States, supra note 7. The classical exposition of the Court's
abhorrence of abstract opinions is found in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,
239-41 (1937):
The Constitution limits the exercise of the judicial power to "cases" and "con-
troversies" .... A "controversy" in this sense must be one that is appropriate
for judicial determination. . . . A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished
from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from
one that is academic or moot. . . . The controversy must be definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations. . . . It must be a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive charac-
ter, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
The fact that litigants utilize a statutory procedural device providing for relief of a
"declaratory" nature (as provided, e.g., by Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-29 (1958)) does
not preclude the Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction "so long as the case
retains the essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, con-
troversy, which is finally determined by the judgment below." Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933). The Haworth case, supra, held that the enter-
tainment of declaratory judgment proceedings, as authorized under the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958), and interpreted to apply only to "cases or
controversies," was validly within the federal judicial power.9 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936). This oft-quoted statement appears in
Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion, in which he summarized the rules utilized by the
Supreme Court in avoidance of constitutional questions: constitutional issues affecting
legislation will not be dete,'mined (1) in friendly, non-adversary proceedings, (2) in advance
of the necessity of deciding them, (3) in broader terms than are required by the precise
facts to which the ruling is to be applied, (4) if the record presents some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of, (5) at the instance of one who fails to show that
he is injured by the statute's operation, or (6) who has availed himself of its benefits, or
(7) if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.
Id. at 346-48.
"
5 See Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S.
549, 568-74 (1947).
" Conn. Acts, 1879, c. 78. At first, the prohibition against use of contraceptives was
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prosecutions involving private medical advice by a doctor to his
individual patients, or their private use of contraceptive devices."2
The evident lack of enforcement of the statute, emphasized by the
"inherently bizarre" nature of a prosecution of spouses for the use
of contraceptives,"3 demonstrated an absence of any realistic threat
of prosecution of Appellants. Such an actual immediate threat of
prosecution was posited by the Court as an indispensable element
of the exigent adversity that was required to evoke its power to
resolve constitutional issues." The admission of the state's attorney,
by demurrer, that the statute would be enforced was considered by
the Court to be merely a formal agreement between the parties that
"collides with plausibility" and hence "too fragile a foundation for
indulging in constitutional adjudication.""5
The significance of the case rests upon the Court's avoidance of
the exercise of its power of judicial review despite the fact that all
the parties involved in the litigation, and the state courts below,
readily admitted the existence of a valid, and keenly-disputed,
justiciable controversy. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who announced the
judgment of the Court, for the two decades before his recent retire-
ment had been the central figure and articulate spokesman of the
cautious, self-denying approach to judicial review. " A philosophy of
intellectual humility and pragmatic skepticism, in the tradition of
Justices Holmes and Brandeis, was instrumental in the molding of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concept of the limited role of the judiciary
in a democratic society." This Pyrrhonistic distrust of judge-made
an integral part of an overall law against obscenity. Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation
of America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, p. 13. The statute was the result of the efforts of
Anthony Comstock, the moralist zealot who inspired the foundation of the New York
Society for the Suppression of Vice in 1873 and the Watch and Ward Society of Boston
in 1876. See Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, 367 U.S. at 520 n.10; Broun & Leech,
Anthony Comstock (1927).
12 See note 6 supra.
13367 U.S. at 502 n.3:
The assumption of prosecution of spouses for use of contraceptives is not only
inherently bizarre, as was admitted by counsel, but is underscored in its
implausibility by the disability of spouses, under Connecticut law, from being
compelled to testify against one another.
'4367 U.S. at 508:
The fact that Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of this
statute deprives these controversies of the immediacy which is an indispensable
condition of constitutional adjudication. This Court cannot be umpire to
debates concerning harmless, empty shadows. To find it necessary to pass on
these statutes now, in order to protect appellants from the hazards of prose-
cution, would be to close our eyes to reality.
'5367 U.S. at S01.
16 See Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court (1961).
"Professor Frankfurter, writing in 1931, summarized the philosophical criteria of Mr.
Justice Brandeis: "A philosophy of intellectual humility determines Mr. Justice Brandeis'
conception of the Supreme Court's function: an instinct against the tyranny of dogma and
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law'" found expression in the oft-repeated axiom of "judicial re-
straint"-the dogma that the law-making function rests with the
legislatures and not the politically unresponsible courts. " From such
scepticism regarding the perdurance of any man's wisdom, though he be judge." Frank-
furter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 87 (1931).
In 1938, a year before he was appointed to the Supreme Court, Professor Frankfurter
delivered three lectures at Harvard designed to convey a sympathetic insight into the con-
stitutional philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes. These lectures also candidly portrayed Frank-
furter's view of the function of the Supreme Court in modern society:
While the Supreme Court is thus in the exacting realm of government, it is
itself freed from the terrible burdens of governing. The Court is the brake
on other men's actions, the judge of other men's decisions. Responsibility
for action rests with legislators. The range of the Court's authority is thus
very limited, but its exercise may vitally affect the nation. No wonder John
Marshall spoke of this power of the Court as "delicate".
No man who ever sat on the Court has been more keenly or more con-
sistently sensitive than Mr. Justice Holmes to the dangers and difficulties in-
herent in the power of judges to review legislation. For it is subtle business
to decide, not whether legislation is wise, but whether legislators were reason-
able in believing it to be wise. In view of the complexities of modern society
and the restricted scope of any man's experience, tolerance and humility in
passing judgment on the worth of the experience and beliefs, of others become
crucial faculties in the disposition of cases. The successful exercise of such
judicial power calls for rare intellectual disinterestedness and penetration,
lest limitation in personal experience and imagination operate as limitations
of the Constitution. These insights Mr. Justice Holmes applied in hundreds
of cases and expressed in memorable language. . . . Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Holmes and the Supreme Court 60, 61 (2d ed. 1961).
See also Mendelson, op. cit. supra note 16, at 124-31.
" In Thomas, Felix Frankfurter: Scholar on the Bench 285-86 (1960), an admiring
biographer has written of Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
One does not have to look far in Justice Frankfurter's writings to find at
least tacit approval if not preference for the British approach. The most super-
ficial examination of his judicial philosophy reveals self-professed Anglophilism.
Its roots trace back to many important figures in English thought. For ex-
ample, Jeremy Bentham's dislike for judge-made law and his insistence on the
completeness of legislative statement of purpose through codes echo to some
degree in Frankfurter's opinions. . . . It is perhaps in this area of bowing
before congressional will and advocating self-restraint that Justice Frankfurter
comes closest to the British legislative supremacy tradition.
19 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in AFL v. American Sash & Door Co.,
335 U.S. 538, 542, 55-57 (1949), is an expositive comment on the necessarily limited
role of the judiciary in a democratic society. See also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 318 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Miss Thomas, in her biography of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, has this explanation of his
view of the limited competence of the judiciary, Thomas, op. cit. supra note 18, at 277:
The basic point in his conception of judicial review is that a politically un-
responsible branch of government is sitting in judgment on the competence
of a co-ordinate politically responsible branch. Since "legislation is the most
sensitive reflex of politics," and is "most responsive to public ends and public
feelings," [Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government 10 (1930)] the
Court in exercising judicial review calls to account not only the legislature
but also the people. For someone who is a majoritarian, as Frankfurter is,
this is a most awesome duty.
And further, id. at 282:
[Mr.] Justice Frankfurter's primary motivation for self-restraint is his theory
of democratic government and the preponderant role that the politically
responsible legislature plays therein. He feels that "judicial review is a de-
liberate check upon democracy through organs of government not subject
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artfully-woven webs of sophistry arose Mr. Justice Frankfurter's in-
sistence that the Court exercise its judicial power only when a case
or controversy, in the strictest and most confined sense, and without
regard to artificial admissions of the parties, was under considera-
tion.2" No other member of the Court invoked more rigorously the
traditional limits of its jurisdiction or reasoned more eloquently that
the Court "has no greater duty than the duty not to decide ... .".
The Court in the principal case, in confining itself to the in-
dispensability of adversity in constitutional litigation and emphasiz-
ing the lack of evidence of an actual "threat" of prosecution,22 brush-
ed aside the more obscure but crucial issue: the mere existence of the
state penal statute, which was of a self-enforcing nature, produced
a substantial hardship upon the litigants." Enforcement of the
to popular control." [Frankfurter, John Marshall, in Government Under Law
(1956)]
20 See Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Process of Judicial Review, 103 U, Pa.
L. Rev. 295, 315-18 (1954). Perhaps Mr. Justice Frankfurter's most widely quoted dis-
cussion of justiciability was his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951). See also, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 497 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
21 In the 1931 tribute to Mr. Justice Brandeis, Professor Frankfurter wrote with typical
esteem:
In his whole temperament, Mr. justice Brandeis is poles apart from the attitude
of the technically-minded lawyer. Yet no member of the Court invokes more
rigorously the traditional limits of its jurisdiction. In view of our federalism
and the Court's peculiar function, questions of jurisdiction in constitutional
adjudication imply questions of political power. The history of the Court
and the nature of its business admonish against needless or premature decisions.
It has no greater duty than the duty not to decide or not to decide beyond
its circumscribed authority. And so Mr. Justice Brandeis will decide only if
the record presents a case-a live, concrete, present controversy between
litigants. Frankfurter, supra note 17, at 79.
The description of Mr. Justice Brandeis' view of the judicial process is equally applicable
to Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Cf. Davis, Standing, Ripeness and Civil Liberties: A Critique
of Adler v. Board of Education, 38 A.B.A.J. 927 n.13 (1952): "Not only is Frankfurter
the only Justice who almost always favors closing the judicial doors when the Court divides
on such issues as standing and ripeness, but he is the only Justice who is often alone in
taking that position."
22Mr. Justice Frankfurter termed the fear of enforcement of the statute as merely
"chimerical." 367 U.S. at 508. Any controversy between Appellants and the state prosecuting
authorities was solely "debates concerning harmless, empty shadows." Ibid. The Court's
opinion also implied that denial of relief to the Appellants would present slight actual
hardship. Id. at 509.
aThe contention of the married women was that they were unable to obtain proper
medical advice because their physician was inhibited by the state penal statute and the
threat of prosecution by the state's attorney. The Court asserted that the compliance with
the statute was not "grounded in a realistic fear of enforcement." The statute's self-enforcing
effect was evident in that even though the non-cooperating doctor's fear of enforcement
may have been unjustified, he was nevertheless coerced into compliance and thus unwilling
to prescribe contraceptives.
When a statute is self-enforcing, a showing of an immediate threat of prosecution should
be unnecessary. For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the chal-
lenged statute was not to become effective for more than seventeen months after the case
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statute by the state prosecuting authorities would undoubtedly have
abridged the married couples' right to enjoy the privacy of their
marital relations" and the doctor's right to advise his patients." How-
ever, when such a statute is self-enforcing, its sheer existence should
create a justiciable controversy.2 Upon Appellants' showing that the
statute barred them from engaging in the conduct in which they
asserted a right to engage, the requisite antagonistic adversity should
was argued before the Court. There the statute was self-enforcing because its mere existence
evoked reactions by parents that had a direct economic effect on the Society of Sisters.
The Court found the injury to the Society "present and very real," id. at 536, and reached
the merits of the constitutional issues. Cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923).
A more objective inquiry by the Court in the principal case would seem to be, not
whether there was an actual threat of enforcement, but whether the complainants were
in fact injured in view of the self-enforcing nature of the statute.
24 Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion cogently pictured state interference with the
privacy of the home:
Precisely what is involved here is this: the State is asserting the right to
enforce its moral judgment by intruding upon the most intimate details of the
marital relation with the full power of the criminal law. Potentially, this
could allow the deployment of all the incidental machinery of the criminal
law, arrests, searches and seizures; inevitably, it must mean at the very least
the lodging of criminal charges, a public trial, and testimony as to the corpus
delicti. Nor could any imaginable elaboration of presumptions, testimonial
privileges, or other safeguards, alleviate the necessity for testimony as to the
mode and manner of the married couples' sexual relations, or at least the op-
portunity for the accused to make denial of the charges. In sum, the statute
allows the State to inquire into, prove and punish married people for the
private use of their marital intimacy. 367 U.S. at 548.
Physical invasion of the home is protected by the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution as applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). It has been argued that the scope of the fourth and four-
teenth amendments is broad enough to protect the privacy of the home against all un-
reasonable intrusions of whatever character. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), expressed the following view of the comprehen-
sive constitutional right of privacy:
[The makers of the Constitution] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every un-
justifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
25 In broad, sweeping terms Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion attacked the statute's
interference with freedom of speech:
We witness in this case a sealing of the lips of a doctor because he desires to
observe the law, obnoxious as the law may be. The State has no power to put
any sanctions of any kind on him for any views or beliefs that he has or for
any advice he renders. These are his professional domains into which the State
may not intrude. . . . A society that tells its doctors under pain of criminal
penalty what they may not tell their patients is not a free society. 367 U.S.
at 514-15.
Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1956) (teacher comes within freedom
of speech guarantees of first amendment); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949) (public speaker); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (public speaker).
26 See note 23, supra.
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have existed, thus making it incumbent upon the Court to consider
the merits of the controverted constitutional issues)'
William L. Morrow
Evidence- Criminal Tax Evasion- Proof of Willful Intent
Defendant was convicted of willful evasion of federal income
taxes.' The government, over Defendant's objection, introduced the
following facts as evidence of his willful intent: (1) Defendant's
bank, acting under Defendant's orders, repeatedly refused to pro-
duce portions of its books and records concerning Defendant when
requested to do so by a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service;'
(2) the bank, again pursuant to Defendant's orders, refused to
comply with a court order demanding the records.! In the suit against
the bank, Defendant intervened and did not authorize the bank to
release the records until his petition for certiorari was refused by the
Supreme Court.4 In the criminal trial the court instructed the jury
as follows: "There is evidence in this case that attempts were made
to impede the . . . investigations. . . .If you find that an attempt
to impede the investigation was made by the Defendant, you may
consider the fact as bearing on the intention of the Defendant. ..."'
"' There can be no quarrel with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's insistence upon judicial
restraint so as to avoid needless constitutional decisions. However, the doctrine should be
exercised with care lest it become, in the words of Mr. Justice Harlan, a "catch-all for an
unarticulated discretion on the part of this Court to decline to adjudicate appeals involving
Constitutional issues." 367 U.S. at 530. The avoidance of constitutional issues may at times
be used as a manipulative device by a Court that prefers not to decide difficult questions
of constitutionality, thus reducing judicial self-restraint to judicial self-abnegation. In such
instances, deliberately self-imposed judicial impotence results in a mutilation of justice to
litigants legitimately seeking judicial relief. Cf. Pritchett, Libertarian Motivations on the
Vinson Court, 47 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 321, 336 (1953):
Frankfurter's major guides are negative in character-judicial self-restraint,
deference to the legislature, the executive, and the states. But deciding Supreme
Court cases is a positive job. There are responsibilities of judging which the
Court cannot put off on a state court or a legislature. Frankfurter has on
occasions come too close to abdicating this responsibility.
'Section 7203 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 provides: "Any person required by this
chapter to pay any estimated tax, or required by law or regulations made under authority
thereof to make a return or declaration . .. who willfully fails . . . to make such return
or declaration . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .. "
Hecklering, Tax Fraud Investigations: Cooperative or Adversary Proceedings? 61 Taxes
807, 809 (1961), indicates the relevance of such action to the issue of willful evasion by
the following statement: "As soon as a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service appears
on the scene, it should become apparent that the government is considering whether
criminal prosecution is warranted."
a Section 7604 of the 1954 Code authorizes such an order.
4 In the Matter of Foster, 159 F. Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 183 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
'Emphasis added by the court of appeals. 309 F.2d 8, 15 (4th Cir. 1962).
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Held, reversed and remanded: Evidence of acts which impede in-
vestigation of criminal income tax evasion is not admissible to show
the existence of a willful intent to defraud so long as the acts are
committed in pursuance of a legally permissible course of conduct.
United States v. Foster, 309 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1962).
The Internal Revenue Code6 classifies as a misdemeanor the willful
failure to file a tax return as required by statute and by the regula-
tions.' Several courts have defined "willfulness" for the purpose of
this provision as that state of mind in which the taxpayer is fully
aware of the tax obligation that he seeks to conceal.! The act of
evasion must be done willfully and knowingly as distinguished from
that done as a result of accident, mistake, neglect, or because of a
bona fide belief that the income involved is not taxable.9 However,
direct proof is not required;1" willfulness, as a question of fact, can
be established by inferences drawn from combinations of acts and
circumstances." The specific problem of the instant case was whether
evidence of legally permissible acts of resistance to investigation could
be introduced as proof of a willful intent to defraud the government.
Since the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
personal, neither bank records" nor corporate documents" concern-
ing a taxpayer fall within the scope of its protection. Moreover,
personal tax records, insofar as they are required under the Internal
Revenue Code, are not immune from inspection, since the constitu-
tional privilege does not extend to books and records which the law
requires one to keep. 4
6 See note 1 supra for the text of § 7203 of the 1954 Code.
7Section 7203 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 provides that the punishment for the
offense shall be a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both, along with the costs of prosecution.
'See Lloyd v. United States, 226 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Norris, 205
F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Putek, 55-1 U.S.T.C. 9243 (D.N.J. 1954). In
addition to a mere attempt to defeat the tax, an essential element of the offense is the
willful nature of the attempt.
' United States v. Hooper, 216 F.2d 684, 686 (10th Cir. 1954).
"0 See United States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1957); Hooper v. United States,
supra note 9; Graves v. United States, 191 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1953).
"1 United States v. Norris, 205 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1953); Gaunt v. United States, 184
F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1950); United States v. Commerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1933).
"' Because the privilege is personal, one person cannot invoke it for the benefit of someone
else. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
"aWheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911).
"4All v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954); Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367 (1951); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1947). Section 6001 of the 1954
Code provides: "Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collec-
tion thereof, shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns, and




Courts have permitted juries to draw inferences prejudicial to the
taxpayer because of non-production of "required records" in two
different instances. First, there are cases in which the taxpayer fails
to keep records," or else keeps them but through his negligence they
are lost or destroyed."6 Second, there are cases in which the taxpayer
has the records but effectively prevents the government from obtain-
ing them.' In Beard v. United States, " the Eighth Circuit said that
although willfulness could not be inferred from the taxpayer's re-
fusal to produce, it was "natural and proper . . .[to infer] that the
records disclose improper conduct. . . ."" In Landy v. United
States," the Fifth Circuit limited the Beard decision to cases of
required records, stating that Beard did not apply to a refusal to
answer questions propounded by government agents. In only one
case has the refusal to produce records upon request been allowed
as evidence of a willful intent to defraud, and there the evidence
was allowed only to rebut testimony of the taxpayer concerning his
alleged good intentions to help the agents in their investigation."
In the principal case the defendant was recalcitrant from the be-
ginning. However, since the government agents finally obtained and
introduced into evidence the contents of the records, the basis for
an inference that the records contained prejudicial material was
removed. The trial court, nevertheless, charged the jury that the
defendant's attempt to impede the investigation could be considered
as bearing on his intention." In finding this charge erroneous, the
Fourth Circuit said that defendant's "refusal was in a statutory
proceeding where the statute gave a clear right to a hearing. Outside
this proceeding all he did was to delay decision to produce the bank
records until he had conferred with his attorneys, certainly not
an unreasonable insistence."2a
With respect to the demand of the revenue agent that he produce
"See Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1956); Hooper v. United States,
216 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1954). In Smith, the court stated that the taxpayer's failure to
keep records was a circumstance for jury consideration in determining his guilt or innocence.
"gUnited States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1957); Yoffe v. United States, 153
F.2d 570 (ist Cir. 1946). In these cases, evidence of lost records supported an inference
that the information they contained would be harmful to defendants charged with an
attempt to evade taxes.
"See Olson v. United States, 191 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1951).
'8222 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1955).
19Id. at 94.
20283 F.2d 303 (Sth Cir. 1960).
"Myres v. United States, 174 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1949). In this case the court said
that evidence of the taxpayer's refusal to give up his records was entitled to significance
especially considering his professed desire to help the investigators. See also United States
v. Mousley, 201 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1962).




his records, no inference of guilt should be drawn from a taxpayer's
participation in the hearing before the district court, since he is
legally entitled to that proceeding. The freedom from having an
inference of guilt or bad faith drawn from his participation in the
hearing is analogous to that afforded in situations in which a person
pleads a constitutional privilege. Thus, in Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ.,24 the Supreme Court said, "[W]e must condemn the
practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the exercise of a person's
constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment. . . . The privilege
against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if
its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of
guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury. '2' The court in the
instant case correctly stated the same principle: "[A]s the impeding
was entirely permissible, the jury should not be allowed to draw
from it an inference of misdoing on the part of the accused."2
Inherent in situations similar to the one presented in the instant
case is the problem of the obligation of a taxpayer to respond to the
inquiries of the Internal Revenue Service. 7 Two conflicting principles
must be considered in determining the taxpayer's duty: (1) every
person has an obligation to pay his legal share of taxes, but (2)
every person has a right not to incriminate himself.8 In criminal
investigations the privilege against self-incrimination should control."
Therefore, at the outset of an income tax investigation the problem
is whether or not its nature is civil or criminal. Assignment of a
case to a special agent normally means that a criminal investigation
is afoot, but a regular revenue agent can also initiate a criminal
investigation. Moreover, in common practice an investigation that
begins as a civil matter may become a criminal proceeding.
Under the specific facts in the instant case, the correct decision
was reached. Although the question had not been previously decided,
a contrary answer could have been implied from other opinions"' to
support the proposition that acts which impede governmental in-
vestigations are admissible as facts from which there can be drawn
an inference of fraudulent intent. However, the result in the instant
case should allay the fears of a taxpayer who refuses to produce his
24350 U.S. 551 (1956).
:1ld. at 556-57.
2 309 F.2d at 15.
2 The court expressly declined to comment on this problem. 309 F.2d at 15.
s Hecklering, supra note 2.
29The limits of permissible resistance must always be kept in mind. Section 7210 of
the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 places a possible penalty of a $1000 fine and a year in prison
for failure to obey a summons to produce testimony.
3°Beard v. United States, 222 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1955); Olsen v. United States, 191
F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1951); see text accompanying note 17 supra.
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records until his procedural rights have been exhausted. On the other
hand, fnow that a taxpayer's rights have been defined, he will likely
be less eager to cooperate with government agents in both criminal
and civil investigations. Investigators may find it increasingly neces-
sary to employ court summons in order to examine books and records.
The taxpayer knows that he may use his statutory rights to the
fullest extent to resist a criminal investigation, or a civil investiga-
tion which subsequently becomes a criminal matter; and the evi-
dence of his resistance in the earlier stages may not be introduced at
his trial as proof of a willful intent to evade taxes.
Blair Rugh
Evidence - Privileged Communication -
Corporation File Copy of Census Form
The Federal Trade Commission' ordered St. Regis Paper Company
to produce its file copies of forms which it had submitted to the
Census Bureau for the Census of Manufacturers. St. Regis refused
to comply, alleging that the file copies were privileged communica-
tions under section 9 of the Census Act.' The file copy and the
original, both government forms, were marked "confidential" and
"not to be used for purposes of taxation, investigation, or regula-
tion." The Trade Commission applied for a writ of mandamus to
compel submission of the forms.' The federal district court ordered
St. Regis to produce the file copies,4 and the court of appeals affirmed.!
Because of a conflict in the circuits,' the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.7 Held, affirmed: File copies of reports which
Pursuant to Federal Trade Commission Act § 6, 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. S 46
(1958).
'Census Act § 9, 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1958), provides:
INFORMATION AS CONFIDENTIAL; EXCEPTION: (a) Neither the
Secretary, nor any other officer or employee of the Department of Commerce
or bureau or agency thereof, may, except as provided in section 8 of this
title-(1) use the information furnished under the provisions of this title
for any purposes other than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied;
or (2) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any particular
establishment or individual under this title can be identified; or (3) permit
anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the Department or
bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports.
'Such action is authorized by S 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 722
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958).
4 181 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
5285 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960).
'In FTC v. Dilger, 276 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1960), the Seventh Circuit held, on similar
facts, that the privilege extended to the file copy.
7365 U.S. 857 (1961).
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are submitted to the Bureau of the Census are not privileged under
section 9 of the Census Act and are subject to production on order
of the Federal Trade Commission. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United
States, 368 U.S. 208 (1962). Overruled: 76 Stat. 922 (1962),
amending Census Act § 9(a), 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1958).'
The concept of privileged communications is a creation of the law
of evidence.! In an effort to procure evidence for litigation, the
common law regarded the act of giving testimony as a public duty,"
and for more than three centuries, it has been recognized as a funda-
mental maxim that the public has a right to every man's evidence."
A "privilege" is an exception to this obligation to give testimony."
The exception is granted "to protect interests and relationships which
are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some inci-
dental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of
justice."' 3 Privileges are usually in derogation of the common law
(although some came from the common law)' 4 and generally owe
their existence to statute." Because of the public policy against sup-
pression of evidence, statutes which grant an immunity from dis-
closure are strictly construed." Professor Wigmore argues that the
following are prerequisites to the existence of a valid privilege:"
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
8 See note 30 infra, for text of the amendment.
9 Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Decker, 150 Miss. 621, 116 So. 287 (1928).
"Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
" 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (3d ed. 1940).
1
2 Id. § 2285.
" McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Texas L. Rev. 447
(1938).
" The privileges granted communications between attorney and client and between
husband and wife are regarded by Wigmore as creations of the common law. 8 Wigmore,
op. cit. supra note 11, §§ 2227, 2290, 2333.
"Thomas v. Morris, 286 N.Y. 266, 36 N.E.2d 141 (1941).
"Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez, 4 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1925); Weis v. Weis, 147
Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947); Hyman v. Grant, 102 Tex. 50, 112 S.W. 1042
(1908).
178 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 11, § 2285, at 531. Cases quoting or citing this state-
ment with approval include: Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953);
United States v. Funk, 84 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Ky. 1949); O'Toole v. Ohio German Fire
Ins. Co., 159 Mich. 187, 123 N.W. 795 (1909); Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496,




The census privilege met all four requirements.
The function of the census and the reason for its privilege were
outlined in a Presidential Proclamation in 1929:'"
The sole purpose of the Census is to secure general statistical informa-
tion. . . . No person can be harmed in any way by furnishing the
information required. The Census has nothing to do with taxation....
or with the enforcement of any national, state, or local law or
ordinance. There need be no fear that any disclosure will be made
regarding any individual person or his affairs.
The obvious policy was to encourage frankness in the responses of
companies to census inquiries.'" In section 9 of the Census Act,"
which creates the census privilege, Congress attempted to provide
the state of trust which is so necessary to candid response." Until
the St. Regis decision, it was generally assumed that copies of census
report had a confidential status equal to that of the original reports
filed with the Bureau of the Census.2 FTC v. Dilger," a Seventh
Circuit case decided prior to St. Regis, had so held, and other cases
had indicated agreement with that result.
The St. Regis case presented the Supreme Court with two im-
portant, directly conflicting public interests: free access to evidence
versus the confidentiality necessary to census administration. The
Court decided in favor of the former. Justice Clark, writing for
the majority, said, "Ours is the duty to avoid a construction which
would suppress otherwise competent evidence."'" The Court also
based its decision upon an analogy drawn to income tax returns,
which are privileged in the hands of the Internal Revenue Service
S Presidential Proclamation of November 22, 1929, 46 Stat. 3011, 3012.
1036 Ops. Att'y Gen. 362 (1930).
20 Census Act § 9, 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1958); see note 2 supra for the text of the statute.
21 In addition, § 214 of the Census Act, 13 U.S.C. § 214 (1958), provides criminal
sanctions for unauthorized disclosure by an officer or employee of the Department of Com-
merce.
22S. Rep. No. 2218, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. (1962), 87 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5122.
23276 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1960).
' FTC v. Orton, 175 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), resembled in many respects the
St. Regis case. In both cases the FTC sought to compel production of information that the
defendant company had supplied to the Census of Manufacturers. The Census forms on
which the information was submitted were essentially the same. In the Orion case, how-
ever, the FTC attempted to compel the company to submit the forms which it had de-
livered into the physical possession of the Census Bureau. In St. Regis, the FTC sought
the company's own file copies. In the Orion case the court held that the defendant com-
pany had no obligation to reacquire the information and deliver it up to the FTC. In
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 21 F.R.D. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), defendants asked
that the government be required to produce census records of other corporations. The Sec-
retary of Commerce refused. The court held that the Secretary can disclose information
only when the disclosure will not be detrimental to the reporting company. The govern-
ment cannot waive the reporting company's privilege. The compulsory production of file
copies was not decided because the defendants voluntarily produced their file copy.
"- 368 U.S. at 218.
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but not in the files of the reporting company."' Finally, the Court
reasoned that since the FTC could obtain the identical information
through its own power of requiring special reports, it should logi-
cally be able to compel the file copy and take advantage of the
organization of the information afforded by the retained census form.
Although the Court's conclusion was grounded in persuasive prec-
edent, the result of the St. Regis decision was undesirable. With-
holding the census privilege from file copies was in accord with the
prevailing view that statutes creating privileges are to be strictly con-
strued." However, the court underestimated the need for an exten-
sion of the privilege, since the prerequisites" for a privilege all
exist in the instance of census file copies. The effect of the St.
Regis decision upon the administration of the census was unfortunate.
It prompted companies to destroy their file copies, caused a loss of
faith in the Census Bureau, and led to a deterioration in surveys."
In October of 1962, at the urging of the Department of Commerce,
Congress recognized the need for the privilege and passed legislation
which overruled St. Regis. Public Law 87-813 amended section 9 (a)
of the Census Act to extend the census privilege to company file
copies." This extension of confidentiality to the file copy is not only
desirable but vital. No amount of coercion can yield the candid
submission of data that will now be obtained by the assurances
that the information will be held in confidence. The file copy,
often used later by the company as a reference for further statistical
calculation, is an integral part of the census machinery, and as such
is entitled to the protection of the census privilege.
Don C. Nix
20Tollefsen v. Phillips, 16 F.R.D. 348 (D. Mass. 1954); Volk v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 19 F.R.D. 103 (D. Minn. 1950); Reeves v. Pennsylvania R.R., 80 F. Supp. 107 (D.
Del. 1948); The Sultana, 77 F. Supp. 287 (W.D.N.Y. 1948).
217 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
:a See text accompanying note 17 supra.
29S. Rep. No. 2218, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 87 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
5122.
30 7 6 Stat. 922 (1962), amending Census Act § 9(a), 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1958). 13
U.S.C. S 9(a) (1958), provides:
No department, bureau, agency, officer, or employee of the Government, ex-
cept the Secretary in carrying out the purposes of this Title, shall require,
for any reason, copies of census reports which have been retained by any such
establishment or individual. Copies of census reports which have been so
retained shall be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the con-
sent of the individual or establishment concerned, be admitted as evidence or
used for any purpose in any action, suit, or other judicial or administrative
proceeding.
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Procedure - Special Appearance - Texas Rule 120a
Rule 120a' of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, effective Sep-
tember 1, 1962, provides that a party may make a special appearance'
before a Texas court to contest that court's jurisdiction over his
person or property on the ground that either he or his property was
not amenable to service of process. If the court determines that it
has jurisdiction, the questioning party may then appear generally
for any purpose, and his subsequent general appearance will not be
considered a waiver of his contest over the jurisdiction.
Rule 120a does not inject a totally new concept into Texas pro-
cedure. Under the common law, as it existed in Texas prior to 1879,
a special appearance was permitted.' The abolition of special appear-
ances in that year marked Texas' departure from the position taken
by the overwhelming majority of the other common law states and
countries.4 Under the rules existing after 1879, until rule 120a was
Rule 120a, Tex. R. Civ. P., provides as follows:
(I) Notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 121, 122 and 123 [see notes 23,
24, 25 infra], a special appearance may be made by any party either in person
or by attorney for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person or property of the defendant on the ground that such party
or property is not amenable to process issued by the courts of this State. A
special appearance may be made as to an entire proceeding or as to any sever-
able claim involved therein. Such special appearances shall be made by sworn
motion filed prior to plea of privilege or any other plea, pleading, or motion;
provided, however, that a plea of privilege and any other plea, pleading, or mo-
tion may be contained in the same instrument or filed subsequent thereto with-
out waiver of such special appearance. The issuance of process for witnesses,
the taking of depositions, the serving of requests for admissions, and the use of
discovery processes, shall not constitute a wavier of such special appearance.
Every appearance, prior to judgment, not in compliance with this rule is a
general appearance.
(2) Any motion to the jurisdiction provided for herein shall be heard and
determined before a plea of privilege or any other plea or pleading may be
heard. No determination of any issue of fact in connection with the objection
to jurisdiction is a determination of the merits of the case or any aspect
thereof.
(3) If the court sustains the objection to jurisdiction, an appropriate order
shall be entered. If the objection to jurisdiction is overruled, the objecting
party may thereafter appear generally for any purpose. Any such special
appearance or such general appearance shall not be deemed a waiver of the
objection to jurisdiction when the objecting party or subject matter is not
amenable to process issued by the courts of this State.
'A "special appearance" is a "submission [to jurisdiction] for some specific purpose
only, not for all the purposes of the suit." Louisville & N.R.R. v. Industrial Bd., 282 I1.
136, 118 N.E. 483, 485 (1917).
a See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Stevens, 109 Tex. 262, 206 S.W. 921 (1918); Hagood
v. Dial, 43 Tex. 625 (1875); Robinson v. Schmidt, 48 Tex. 13, 19 (1877); Richardson v.
Wells, 3 Tex. 223 (1848).
' Texas' change has been attributed to Texas' "frontier spirit" and lack of patience with
what were considered technicalities. See Hearon, Non-Resident Defendants and the Special
Appearance in Texas, 32 Texas L. Rev. 78, 80 (1953). The only jurisdictions which do not
permit special appearance are the Isle of Man, Harris v. Taylor, 2 K.B. 580 (1915), and
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promulgated, if an action were filed in a Texas court against a non-
resident over whom the court had no valid basis for in personam
jurisdiction, the nonresident defendant was held to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the Texas court even if he appeared solely to
question the validity of service. If the nonresident defendant chose
not to appear, and a default judgment' were entered against him, the
judgment was void for want of proper service. However, the judg-
ment's invalidity could only be shown in subsequent proceedings,
which took two forms in Texas: direct attacks and collateral attacks.
If the defendant directly attacked the judgment on appeal, the court
might have ruled in his favor on lack of jurisdiction, but having
come before the court on appeal, he would have then waived citation.7
Moreover, the judgment could not be collaterally attacked in Texas,
if it were regular on its face,' unless the court had no possible juris-
diction, e.g., a case involving admiralty.! Under both the old and
new rules, however, the defendant can: (1) question jurisdiction in
his home state by bringing an action for a declaratory judgment,
assuming he can obtain in personam jurisdiction over the original
plaintiff, or (2) raise lack of jurisdiction as a defense when the plain-
tiff sues on his judgment. Full faith and credit" will not prevent the
defense, since other states are not required to honor the judgment of
a sister state court that is rendered without jurisdiction over the
person.
In York v. Texas" the United States Supreme Court held that the
old Texas rules of procedure constituted a mere inconvenience and
not a deprival of due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
ment."5 When the Supreme Court held subsequently that even the
Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. § 1881 (1956). However, Mississippi's statute has been inter-
preted to allow what is in effect a special appearance. See Note, Special Appearance in
Mississippi, 19 Miss. L.J. 59 (1947).
5 York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
6A default judgment is rendered when the defendant fails to answer or plead within
the time allowed or neglects to appear at the time of the trial. Merrill v. Dunn, 140 S.W.2d
320, 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism., judgm. cor.
7Rule 123, Tex. R. Civ. P. (see note 25 infra); see Industrial Fin. Serv. Co. v. Riley,
295 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), aff'd in part and reversed in part on other grounds,
157 Tex. 306, 302 S.W.2d 652 (1957).
'Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626, 33 S.W. 325 (1895).
'Tammen v. Schaefer, 101 S.W. 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).10 U.S. Const. art. 4, §j 1.
"x Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S.
457 (1873).
12137 U.S. 15 (1890).
"3 The Court stated:
It is certainly more convenient that a defendant be permitted to object to
the service . . . in the first instance. . . . But mere convenience is not substance
of right. . . . Can it be held . . . that legislation simply forbidding the de-
fendant to come into court and challenge the validity of service upon him
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rendition of a void judgment was a deprival of due process," some
analysts concluded that the York case would be overruled should the
question ever again reach the Court. " Nevertheless, since Texas at-
torneys were still faced with the immediate problem of finding a
substitute for the special appearance, they began to use a fictional
amicus curae to attack jurisdiction." That practice proved cumber-
some since an amicus curiae could not appeal, because he did not
have, in theory, any interest in the suit.' Furthermore, the practice
was severely limited in 1957 when the Texas Supreme Court held,
in Burger v. Burger,'" that a non-resident defendant made a gen-
eral appearance when he paid an alleged amicus curiae to appear
for him.9 One other means of avoiding the harsh effects of the un-
availability of special appearance was removal to a federal court
where the validity of the service of process could be contested. How-
ever, removal was not always possible.
Rule 120a effects a change only in reference to parties who are
not amenable- to the jurisdiction of the court, i.e., nonresidents. The
older provisions, rules 121 through 123," which previously excluded
a special appearance by anyone,2' now do so only with respect to
Texas residents, who are always amenable to process issued by a
Texas court. These rules provide that (1) an answer by the defendant
dispenses with the necessity to serve a citation upon him," (2) if the
defendant's motion to quash citation is successful, the defendant is
in a personal action without surrendering himself to the jurisdiction of the
court, but which does not attempt to restrain him from fully protecting his
person, his property and his rights against any attempt to enforce a judgment
rendered without due service of process, and therefore void, deprives him of
liberty or property, within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment?
We think not. 137 U.S. at 21.
14 Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915).
'5 See, e.g., Blair, Constructive General Appearance assd Due Process, 23 Ill. L. Rev.
119 (1928); cf. Hearon, supra note 4, at 78-101, for an excellent discussion in favor of
a new rule allowing special appearance.
16 See Hearon, supra note 4, at 92; McDonald, Texas Civil Practice 5 9:05 (Supp. 1962).
17 See Greathouse v. Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry., 65 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
1s156 Tex. 584, 298 S.W.2d 119 (1957), 11 Sw. L.J. 382 (1957).
'"See also Nicklas v. Ajax Elec. Co., 337 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
" Federal courts have jurisdiction limited to cases arising under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958), or actions involving diversity of
citizenship where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs,
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958). In a federal court jurisdiction may be questioned at any stage
of the proceedings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Federal courts sitting in Texas are not required
to follow Texas practice concerning special appearance. Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Pinkney,
149 U.S. 194 (1893).
21 Tex. R. Civ. P.
2See York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Stevens, 109 Tex.
262, 206 S.W. 921 (1918).
2 Tex. R. Civ. P. 121: "An answer shall constitute an appearance of the defendant
so as to dispense with the necessity for the issuance or service of citation upon him."
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still deemed to have entered his appearance," and (3) if a judgment
is reversed for want of service, the defendant shall be presumed to
have entered his appearance."
The new rule should provide nonresidents with an important
device for testing the extent of the jurisdiction of the Texas courts.
Originally, state jurisdiction over nonresidents was limited to instances
in which the nonresident defendant was served within the bounda-
ries of the forum states. " Through an evolutionary process, a more
liberal approach was adopted when the Supreme Court held that
out-of-state service of process upon a nonresident was not a viola-
tion of due process if the defendant had sufficient "minimum con-
tacts" within the state" and if the cause of action had grown out
of those contacts." Other recent cases"' illustrate this discernible
trend" toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction
over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. With that trend
as a background, the Texas legislature enacted article 203 lb,s' which
allows service of process upon a nonresident person or corporation
doing business within the state." Partially because the absence of a
special appearance practice in Texas precluded the nonresident from
litigating issues involving service of process, "doing business" under
24 Tex. R. Civ. P. 122: "If the citation or service thereof is quashed on motion of the
defendant, such defendant shall be deemed to have entered his appearance .... "
22Tex. R. Civ. P. 123: "Where the judgment is reversed on appeal or writ of error
for want of service, or because of defective service of process, ... the defendant shall
be presumed to have entered his appearance ....2
°Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2'International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 The Court decided that if a non-resident had certain "minimum contacts" within
the state then out-of-state service of process on the non-resident did not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." 326 U.S. at 316. For a discussion of what
constitutes "minimum contacts" see Comment, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations
Under Art. 2031b, 39 Texas L. Rev. 214, 219-20 (1960).
2 In particular see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), 12 Sw.
L.J. 381 (1958). In this case the Supreme Court held that a Texas life insurance company
was subject to California service of process by registered mail delivered in Texas in a suit
arising from a policy issued to a resident of California. The company's only contact in
California had been to solicit a renewal of the policy and accept premium payments thereon
from a California resident. The application of this case has been limited by Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), in which the Court held that the McGee approach must be
restricted to suits arising from contractual obligations.
2" The trend, according to the Court, is based upon the increased nationalization of
commerce and the fact that "modern transportation and communication have made it
much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity." 355 U.S. at 223; see 17 Sw. L.J. 180 (1963).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b, §§ 3, 4 (Supp. 1962), provide that "doing
business" in Texas "shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment" of the Secretary of
State as agent to receive service of citation for an action arising from (1) a contract with
a resident of Texas to be performed in part or wholly within the state or (2) commission
of a tort in part or wholly in Texas.
aaThe constitutionality of this statute has been questioned, in line with the arguments
in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen
Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961); 17 Sw. L.J. 180, 185 n.38 (1963).
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article 2031b has yet to be defined authoritatively.3 More litigation
in this area should be forthcoming now that foreign corporations and
other nonresidents have in rule 120a an effective method of ques-
tioning the validity of service of process by Texas courts.
Rule 120a requires that the special appearance be made by sworn
motion filed prior to any other plea, pleading, or motion, although
any other plea, pleading, or motion may be placed in the same in-
strument or filed subsequently without waiving the special appear-
ance. No provision is made for either withdrawing an answer which
is not a special appearance or for requesting an extension of time
to plead specially. However, if for some reason the proper order of
filing is not followed, it is possible that the courts will consider it
within their discretion to allow a withdrawal so that the special
appearance will not be waived. Such practice is currently followed
in connection with the use of the plea of privilege. 4 On the other
hand, the Texas courts have held that when a defendant requests
an extension of time in order to plead, he invokes "an exercise of
the court's powers and in so doing necessarily subject[s] himself to
the court's jurisdiction."'" Similarly, it can be argued that the request
for a withdrawal of a plea which is not a special appearance is also
an invocation of the court's powers. Thus, the defendant who desires
to dispute his amenability to process, but who also wants an exten-
sion of time in which to prepare his other pleadings, would be well
advised to file his special appearance prior to requesting the exten-
sion. In any event, the rule provides that any motion for special
appearance shall be heard and determined before a plea of privilege
or any other plea or pleading may be heard. Also, determination of
any issue of fact in connection with the objection to jurisdiction will
not be a determination of the merits of the case.
The rule provides that a party may use discovery processes before
appearing specially." McDonald, in Texas Civil Practice,"7 warns
'3 See Comment, suPra note 28, at 214.
14 "Plea of privilege" is the method of raising questions of proper venue in Texas courts.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 86. Since any motion prior to a plea of privilege, other than special
appearance, waives the right to raise the plea, decisions as to due order of pleading in
plea of privilege cases may be considered analogous to due order of pleading under rule
120a. In allowing a withdrawal of a pleading in order to file a plea of privilege, one court
stated: "The purpose of the statute prescribing a due order of pleading was not to deprive
the defendant of any valuable right, but rather had as its purpose the preservation of an
orderly disposition of the case." Beir v. Sandgarten, 99 S.W.2d 1004, 1006 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936).
" Republic Oil & Gas Co. v. Owen, 210 S.W. 319, 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.
36 Rule 120a § 1, sent. 4, quoted note I supra. See also Moore, Federal Practice 3 12.13
(2d ed. 1962). Professor Moore doubts the validity of the federal rule (rule 12 (b),
Fed. R. Civ. P.) which permits a defendant to question jurisdiction at any stage and sug-
gests that once the defendant uses the court with respect to the merits of the case, he
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against the defendant's use of discovery on the subject matter of the
suit and suggests that to be safe, the defendant should apply dis-
covery only to jurisdictional questions. It is difficult, however, to
conceive of such a use. By allowing the defendant to use discovery
prior to a special appearance, the rule would appear to permit dis-
covery on the merits of the case, since no other use by the defendant
is likely. Hence McDonald's caution seems to be without foundation.
One effect of a nonresident's unsuccessful attempt to question
Texas jurisdiction by special appearance will be the application of
the doctrine of res judicata to any further attempts to litigate that
question. In Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, " the
United States Supreme Court held that when a federal district court
determined that it had jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
upon the latter's special appearance, he was barred from raising that
question again in a suit on the judgment in another federal court.
The same principle has been applied when the second suit is on a
state court judgment." By considering the first resolution of the issue
of personal jurisdiction to be res judicata on subsequent attacks, the
Court recognized the principle that a court has jurisdiction to de-
termine its own jurisdiction."' These decisions have been criticized as
"placing the doctrine of res judicata on a plane higher than that
accorded the constitutional requirement of full faith."'" However,
assuming that Baldwin is followed in the future, the nonresident
defendant who is unsuccessful in raising a question of jurisdiction
under Texas' special appearance practice will be barred from col-
laterally attacking that adjudication. The Texas decision will be
res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit.
The new special appearance rule is a desirable procedural change
should not be allowed thereafter to appear to question jurisdiction. However, the argument
is academic, since the rule clearly provides otherwise.
37Op. cit. supra note 16, at 9:05.
as 2 8 3 U.S. 522 (1931).
"gSee Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). However, in dictum, in
Chicago Life Ins. Co., v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 30 (1917), the Court implied that if a
state court's determination that it had jurisdiction was "so gross as to be impossible in a
rational administration of justice" such determination need not be given full faith and
credit. See also, Survey Note, Developments in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
818, 855 (1952).
40 The principle, as a general rule, is equally applicable to questions involving jurisdiction
over subject matter. See Restatement, Judgments § 10(1) (1942): "Where a court has
jurisdiction over the parties and determines that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties cannot collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the court did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, unless the policy underlying the doctrine of res
judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting the court to act beyond its juris-
diction." An example of an outweighing policy is found in Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S.
433 (1940).




which brings Texas in line with other common law states and coun-
tries. There has long been a need for an acceptable method of raising
questions concerning the extension of state court jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants who are served outside of the state. Rule
120a provides a welcome solution.
Howard V. Tygrett, Jr.
Vendor and Purchaser-Loss While Contract Executory-
Right to Insurance Proceeds
Vendor and Purchaser entered into a real estate sales contract
which gave both parties the right to specific performance. Purchaser
took possession and began monthly payments. Each party separately
contracted for fire insurance, Vendor specifically rejecting a clause
which extended protection to Purchaser. One day before the sched-
uled closing date, the improvements on the land were destroyed by
fire. Two months after the fire, Purchaser paid the balance of the
contract price, and Vendor delivered the deed and assigned rights
under his insurance contract to Purchaser. Purchaser sued both in-
surers, and each insurer filed a cross-claim against the other. Pur-
chaser's claim was settled when each company contributed a pro
rata share of the loss based on the face amount of each policy. This
left the action between the two insurers.' Held: When a fire loss
occurs while a real estate sales contract is executory and each party
to the contract carries separate insurance, if the vendor is subsequently
paid the full contract price by the purchaser, the loss is to be borne
entirely by the purchaser's insurer. Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., -Tex.-, 353 S.W.2d 841 (1962).
The right to insurance proceeds when more than one party has an
interest in the insured property is an issue that has not only split, but
splintered, American jurisdictions. Different philosophies concerning
the nature and purpose of the insurance contract, varying rules for
determining who is to bear the risk of loss, and tortured efforts to
prevent windfalls account for the diversity Modern history on the
subject begins with Paine v. Meller, in which an English court ruled
'The trial court gave judgment for Vendor's insurer and ordered Purchaser's insurer
to pay to Vendor's insurer the amount the latter had contributed toward the settlement.
The court of civil appeals reversed and ordered the loss prorated between the two insurers
in proportion to the face amounts of their respective policies. 347 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961).
2 Young, Some "Windfall Coverages" in Property and Liability Insurance, 60 Colum. L.
Rev. 1063 (1960).
a6 Vesey 349, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (Ch. 1801).
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that a purchaser holding the equitable interest had to bear the risk
of loss. Later, the case of Rayner v. Preston' established that (1) the
vendor's insurance policy was personal to him and (2) even though
the purchaser had to bear the loss by paying the full purchase price
after the fire, he did not have any right to the proceeds under the
vendor's policy. Subsequently, it was decided that the vendor also
had no right to the insurance money, since only the purchaser bore
the loss.'
Rayner v. Preston was understandably unpopular. Under that
rule no one could win except the insurance company, and it was
paid to bear the risk. Consequently, the celebrated dissent in Rayner
v. Preston' formed the germ for a now widely accepted, but dia-
metrically opposed doctrine. In his dissent, Justice James argued that
since the purchaser had equitable title, the vendor was a trustee for
the benefit of the purchaser." Any benefits which the trustee received
incident to legal ownership of the property were to be received for
the benefit of the cestui que trust or the purchaser. In other words,
the insurance company should pay the vendor who should turn the
money over to the purchaser in lieu of the destroyed property. In
1922 Parliament, in effect, enacted into law the rule advocated by
Justice James.
A considerable number of American jurisdictions favor the dissent
in Rayner v. Preston.' Some, however, follow the older English rule. '"
Others have developed home-grown hybrids." Most American cases
are decided on one of the following bases:
(1) The insurance policy is a personal indemnity contract. If the
property is destroyed but the loss is covered by another so that the
insured is reimbursed, the insured cannot recover from his insurer."
418 Ch. D. 1 (1881).
'Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380 (1883), reversing 8 Q.B.D. 613 (1882).
618 Ch. D. 1, 12 (1881).
'Id. at 13.
'Law of Property Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 16.
'See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1403, 1404 (1959): "The great majority of the cases have
applied a theory of constructive trusteeship to the relation of vendor and purchaser .... "
Cases from the following 15 states are then cited: Alabama, California, Georgia, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington. Id. at 1406.
'0Id. at 1404: "A few cases have held that the purchaser has no interest whatever in
the proceeds of an insurance policy procured by the vendor at his own cost ... ," citing
cases from California, Louisiana, New York, and Wisconsin.
" As one example of the special rules, in Minnesota a vendor who has a right to rescind
a contract because of fraud by the purchaser is allowed to recover on the purchaser's
policy for a loss that occurs while the purchaser is in possession. Cetkowski v. Knutson,
163 Minn. 492, 204 N.W. 528 (1925).
"Smith v. Jim Dandy Mkts., 172 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1949); Glen Falls Ins. Co. v.
Sterling, 219 Md. 217, 148 A.2d 453 (1959); Tauriello v. Aetna Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Super.
530, 82 A.2d 226 (1951).
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Nor may anyone else recover, e.g., a purchaser who bears the risk
of loss."
(2) The insurance contract is absolute within its terms. If the
property is destroyed, the insured may recover from his insurer.
Other contract claims of the insured by which he may be reimbursed
are of no concern to the insurer. 4
(3) If the insured is a vendor and the risk of loss is on the pur-
chaser, the vendor can recover subject to a constructive trust for the
purchaser."
(4) When the parties to a contract of sale make an agreement
concerning insurance, the proceeds shall be applied in accordance
with their intent."6 Such an agreement may be an assignment by one
party of his claim17 or an agreement that the purchaser shall assume
payment of premiums on the vendor's policy.8
Difficulties may arise with any one of these four approaches. The
first, based on the nineteenth century English rule,9 may put the
loss on a purchaser who is serenely ignorant of the personal indemnity
concept of insurance. He may see no need of obtaining insurance
since he knows the vendor has the property "covered." However,
after a fire occurs, that purchaser will have to pay the full price for
an ash heap. The insurance company will pay no one, because it is
deemed by law to be subrogated to the vendor's claim against the
"aBrownell v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925). The case contains
a ringing re-affirmation of Rayner v. Preston but is not completely analogous. Risk of
loss was not on the purchaser, as in the Rayner case, because the contract provided that
the premises were to be delivered "in as good condition as they now are, natural wear
excepted." 146 N.E. at 632.
"United States v. American Tobacco Co., 166 U.S. 468 (1897); Edlin v. Security
Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1959); First Nat'l Bank v. Boston Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d
147, 160 N.E.2d 802 (1959); Foster v. Equitable Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 68 Mass. (2 Gray)
216 (1854); Board of Trustees v. Cream City Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Minn. 347, 96 N.W.2d
690 (1959); Kahn v. American Ins. Co., 137 Minn. 16, 162 N.W. 685 (1917); Lampesis
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 101 N.H. 323, 143 A.2d 104 (1958); Foley v. Manufacturers' &
Builders' Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318 (1897); Alexandra Restaurant, Inc. v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 272 App. Div. 346, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd,
297 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d 268 (1948).
'" Vogel v. Northern Assur. Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1955); Alabama Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Serv. v. Nixon, 268 Ala. 271, 105 So. 2d 643 (1958); William Skinner & Sons
v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Ati. 85 (1900); Insurance Co. of No. America v. Alberstadt,
383 Pa. 556, 119 A.2d 83 (1956); Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of No. America,
361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949).
56Raplee v. Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 143 N.E.2d 919 (1957).
"
7 Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Maples, 37 Ala. App. 74, 66 So. 2d 159 (1953);
Vierneisel v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 77 Cal. App. 2d 229, 175 P.2d 63 (Dist. Ct. App.
1946); Allyn v. Allyn, 154 Mass. 570, 28 N.E. 779 (1891); Kost v. Resolute Underwriters,
211 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error dissn.
'"Raplee v. Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 143 N.E.2d 919 (1957); Persico v. Guernsey, 220
N.Y. Supp. 689, aff'd mem., 222 App. Div. 736, 225 N.Y.S. 890 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Naquin v.
Texas Say. & Real Estate Inv. Ass'n, 95 Tex. 313, 67 S.W. 85 (1902).
'9See text accompanying notes 4, 5 supra.
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purchaser. This unhappy result contributes to the prevalence of the
other three views.
In practical application, however, the others also present problems.
Under the second approach, the vendor may be paid twice, once by
his insurer, once by the purchaser."' Or a purchaser who carries in-
surance may be allowed to recover although he has a right to rescind
the sales contract.Y
Under the third approach, i.e., the constructive trust doctrine, the
purchaser may be able to make a handsome profit if both he and the
vendor have policies, for some courts have allowed him to recover
on his own policy and also receive as cestui que trust the proceeds of
the vendor's policy. In toto, he recovers an amount more than
the loss."
The fourth category of decisions, involving assignment of policy
rights, has also resulted in one party's receiving a windfall.' Fewer
problems develop under this approach, however, since the parties
usually bargain for assignments and thereby tend to equalize ad-
vantages between themselves. Also, no difficulty is encountered in
giving the proceeds to the purchaser if he has paid the insurance
premiums.
In the instant case the court did not face the knotty issues which
had resulted in windfalls or losses in the cases discussed above. Re-
covery was not sought by one who had already been made whole.
Moreover, Purchaser could not have recovered more than his loss
since by suing both insurers in the same suit, the loss could have been
prorated. However, the court ruled that the full risk of loss was on
Purchaser's insurer. The court reasoned, first, that Vendor had no
'0See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1403 (1959).
"In Edlin v. Security Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1959), the court held that
even though the vendor received the full purchase price after the loss, he was entitled to
recover from his insurer. The purchaser, who intervened in the suit, was held not entitled
to any part of the insurance proceeds. However, in Board of Trustees v. Cream City Mut.
Ins. Co., 255 Minn. 347, 96 N.W.2d 690 (1959), the court allowed the vendor to recover
but pointedly refrained from expressing a view as to the purchaser's right to the insurance
proceeds since the purchaser was not before the court. In similar situations the insured was
allowed to recover although another repaired the damage. Foley v. Manufacturers' &
Builders' Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318 (1897) (owner-contractor); Alexandra
Restaurant, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 272 App. Div. 346, 71 N.Y.S.2d 515. (Sup.
Ct. 1947), aft'd, 297 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d 268 (1948) (lessor-lessee).
"Lampesis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 101 N.H. 323, 143 A.2d 104 (1958).
"See Vogel v. Northern Assur. Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1955); Dubin Paper Co.
v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949). Both of these cases,
decided under Pennsylvania law, allowed a recovery in excess of loss. Subsequently, the
Pennsylvania courts seem to have changed their position. In Insurance Co. of No. America
v. Alberstadt, 383 Pa. 556, 119 A.2d 83 (1956), the court required that the loss be pro-
rated between the two insurance companies so that the plaintiff could not recover in excess
of the loss.
" See Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Maples, 37 Ala. App. 74, 66 So. 2d 159 (1953).
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claim against his insurer." Since he had the right of specific per-
formance, vendor was paid the full purchase price after the fire and,
therefore, suffered no loss. The court relied principally on a case in
which lessor was denied recovery from his insurer because the damage
had been repaired by the lessee.26 The other cases cited by the court
presented situations in which the plaintiffs were seeking windfalls."
The court then analyzed the doctrine of constructive trusteeship.
It acknowledged that the doctrine was widely accepted and could
be useful, though questionable, in cases in which a purchaser would
otherwise suffer an unforeseen loss. The court set the stage for
future legal struggles by declaring that:
the rule [constructive trusteeship] should have no application when the
vendees have secured their own insurance policy . . . . As it is not
before us here, we leave open the question of whether, where the vendee
has no insurance there can be recovery on the vendor's policy subject
to a constructive trust for the vendee, who is often ignorant of his
legal liability in such a situation . ... "
The court did not feel called upon to adopt a rule that "does violence
to the idemnity concept of insurance"3 for the benefit of a plaintiff
cautious enough to buy his own insurance. Whether the presence of
a less knowledgeable purchaser would require an opposite ruling will
not be known until such a case arises."
The considerable amount of concern expressed by both the ma-
jority and the dissent with respect to the constructive trusteeship
doctrine was probably prompted more by deference to its popularity2
than by its relevance to the case. Initially, Purchaser sought recovery
as an assignee of Vendor's rights under the latter's policy. As such,
he did not seek or need the creation of a fictitious trust relationship.
2' 3 53 S.W.2d at 844.
" Ramsdell v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928).
The Wisconsin court indicated that it would have favored proration if other insurers of
the same property had been before the court. "In equity and good conscience the insurance
companies may yet prorate the loss, but we cannot see how it can be held that the [lessor]
had any actual loss." Id. at 655.
27 Smith v. Jim Dandy Mkts., 172 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1949); Tauriello v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 14 N.J. Super. 530, 82 A.2d 266 (1951).
2 353 S.W.2d at 844.
Hid. at 845.
30 Ibid.
31 It has been suggested that the constructive trusteeship doctrine coincides with the lay
understanding that insurance runs with the property and that "as usual, the courts are
sluggishly following business." Vance, Insurance § 131 (3d ed. 1951).
" Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1403, 1406 (1959): "The rule quite generally followed is that
the proceeds from the vendor's insurance policies, even though the purchaser did not




His assignor, Vendor, contracted for a policy which provided pay-
ment for a loss to the policyholder as his "interest may appear at
time of loss."'" When the loss occurred, Vendor had an interest in
the property equal to the unpaid balance of the purchase price. No
clause in Vendor's insurance contract provided that the insurer would
be relieved of liability if, after the loss, a purchaser should pay the
policyholder an amount equal to the insurance claim. That con-
struction seems to have been fabricated entirely by the court. Such
an interpretation re-enunciates, with all its ancient rigor, the Rayner
v. Preston rule,34 long abandoned in England. Just as in those cases,
the court here requires that (1) insurance be regarded as a personal
indemnity contract and (2) that recovery be barred, even if a loss
is suffered by the person insured, if the insured recovers from another.
Though subrogation is not mentioned, the ruling achieves the same
effect. The court held that the purchaser's payment discharged the
insurance company's liability to the vendor. That is the same as
holding that when the insurance company pays the vendor, the com-
pany can reimburse itself by succeeding to the vendor's rights against
the purchaser. However, except in the case of mortgagees, subroga-
tion to the contract rights of an insured is not generally favored
in this country."
Practical difficulties in applying the rule of the principal case are
pointed out by the dissent. A vendor and a purchaser might enter
into a contract providing for payment of the purchase price
over a period of years. According to the majority opinion, upon a
loss, the vendor would have a claim against his insurer until and
unless he "collects the full purchase price."37 Thus, the installment
contract would have to run its full course before the insurer's liability
would be known.
The holding raises many other questions. It appears to embrace the
old English doctrine, but it leaves the door open for future de-
partures. The principal question in regard to future cases is whether
an uninsured purchaser who bears the risk of loss will be able to
recover on his vendor's policy. Moreover, the most disturbing ques-
tion concerns the effect of the decision on the contractual relations
between the parties. In holding that the vendor's insurer was not
liable, the court denied the right of recovery by an insured who had
33 353 S.W.2d at 846. (Emphasis added.)
3' Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881); Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380 (1883),
reversing 8 Q.B.D. 613 (1882); see notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
35Patterson, Insurance § 33 (2d ed. 1957).
'6353 S.W.2d at 846.
37 Ibid.
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a matured claim under the terms of his contract and also nullified
his assignment of that claim.
Reba Graham Rasor
Venue - Corporations - Registered Office as
Statutory Place of Residence
Plaintiff brought suit in Navarro County against two corpora-
tions, each of which filed a plea of privilege' alleging residence in
Smith County. Plaintiff, in his controverting affidavit,' asserted that
venue lay in Navarro County against one of the corporations, since
its articles of incorporation designated that county as the address of
its registered office.' The corporation did not maintain an office in
Navarro County and it conducted no business there. Its only office
was in Smith County.4 Held: The designation by a corporation of
the county in which its registered office and registered agent are
located constitutes a statutory place of residence of the corporation
for venue purposes. Ward v. Fairway Operating Co., - Tex. -, 364
S.W.2d 194 (1963).
Venue, in modern thinking, can be defined as the place, usually a
county or district, where a cause of action is to be tried.' It must be
distinguished from "jurisdiction" which is the power or authority of
a court to decide a case.' Although generalizations on the subject of
venue are impractical, since it is largely a statutory matter, as a gen-
eral rule venue in civil actions lies in the county in which the de-
fendant resides at the commencement of the action." The primary
1 A plea of privilege to be sued in the county of one's residence is authorized by Rule
86, Tex. R. Civ. P.
'A party who desires to controvert a plea of privilege does so by filing a verified
controverting plea which sets forth "the grounds relied upon to confer venue of such cause
on the court where the cause is pending." Rule 86, Tex. R. Civ. P.
a The Texas Business Corporation Act requires that a corporation shall continuously
maintain (1) a registered office and (2) a registered agent whose address must be identical
to the registered office. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.09 (1956). The post office address
of the initial registered office must be set forth in the articles of incorporation. Tex. Bus.
Corp. Act Ann. art. 3.02A(10) (1956).
'The facts regarding the location of the corporation's business office are stated in the
opinion of the court of civil appeals, 358 S.W.2d 143, 144 (1962).
' Sullivan v. Hall, 86 Mich. 7, 48 N.W. 646 (1891). In Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh,
115 Mont. 469, 146 P.2d 151 (1944), the court stated:
In olden times venue indicated the county from which the jury was to come.
This is the basis for the general rule. "Anciently a jury of one county could
not try any matter arising in another county. A foreign county was almost
as formidable a thing as a foreign country." . . . In present day legal
phraseology "venue" means the proper county for the trial of a cause; that
is, the county or counties fixed by statute for the trial. Id. at 152.
s Toumlin v. James Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 512 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).
"Goodrich v. Superior Oil Co., 150 Tex. 159, 237 S.W.2d 969 (1951).
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question is where does a corporation "reside" for venue purposes. The
answer must be found in the individual state statutes.!
The Model Business Corporation Act,' with certain specific excep-
tions," does not touch the matter of venue, nor does it specify where
a corporation resides. The articles of incorporation (charter) required
by the Model Act need not state the address of the corporation's
principal office or the address of its place of business. Rather, the
articles of incorporation must set forth the address of a registered
office and the name of a registered agent whose business office address
must be identical to the address of the registered office." Thus, in
patterning a corporate act after the Model Act, it was left up to the
individual state legislature to provide conformity between its cor-
porate venue statute and its corporation act. 2
'Similarly, to ascertain if there are any specific venue provisions applicable to the par-
ticular cause of action involved, the venue statute is the guide. However, venue provisions
applicable to particular causes of action are outside the scope of this Note.
'ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act (1953), hereafter referred to as the "Model Act." For
an excellent discussion of the Model Act, its history, its need, states which have used it as a
pattern and to what extent, states considering passage, etc., see Garrett, Model Business
Corporation Act, 4 Baylor L. Rev. 412 (1952).
' For involuntary dissolution of a corporation, the action shall be commenced in either
of two counties, one of which is provided by the act to be the county in which the regis-
tered office is situated. Model Act § 89. The state adopting an act based on the Model Act
will probably provide that the second county is the site of the state capital.
A proceeding to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation shall be brought in
the county in which the registered office or the principal office is situated. Model Act § 90.
"1Model Act § 48(j).
1" The problem of providing conformity between the language of the venue statute and
that of the corporation act has been treated by the states in various ways with varying de-
grees of effectiveness. A few examples are set forth below. In each case the corporation act
requires the corporation: (1) to maintain a registered office and a registered agent and
(2) to set forth in the articles of incorporation the address of the registered office and the
name of the registered agent at such address. None require that the address of the cor-
poration's principal office, place of business, domicile, or residence be set forth.
Illinois, whose corporation act was the model for the Model Act, has a venue statute
which provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every action must be com-
menced (a) in the county of residence of any defendant .. l.. 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 110,
§ 5 (Smith-Hurd 1956). However, the statute provides that, for purposes of venue, "any
private corporation . . . is a resident of any county in which it has its registered office or
other office or is doing business." Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 6(1) (Smith-Hurd 1956). The
"Joint Committee Comment" following this section states: "The term 'principal office' used
in . . . the former act is abandoned as being unduly restrictive and productive of un-
certainty and the term 'registered office or other office' has been substituted."
The venue statute of Pennsylvania provides: "(a) Except as otherwise provided . . . a
personal action against a corporation or similar entity may be brought in and only in (1)
the county where its registered office or principal place of business is located; or (2) a
county where it regularly conducts business." Pa. R. Civ. P. 2179 (1951).
Utah, whose Business Corporation Act became effective January 7, 1962, has a general
venue provision which states that "the action must be tried . . . in the county in which
any defendant resides .... " The same section provides: "[I]f such defendant is a corpora-
tion, any county in which such corporation has its principal office or place of business shall
be deemed the county in which such corporation resides .... " Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7
(1953).
In Oklahoma "an action . . . against a corporation . . . may be brought in the county
in which it is situated, or has its principal office or place of business, or in which any of
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Prior to the passage of the Texas Business Corporation Act in
1955," the corporation statutes required that a corporation set forth
in its charter "the place or places where its business is to be trans-
acted."" The venue statute, then, as now, provided that a corpora-
tion could be sued in the county in which it was domiciled or in
the county in which its principal office was located."1 In Hawk.
17Buck v. Cassidy," a leading case on the matter of corporate venue,
the issue was whether the charter of a corporation which designated
a particular county as its place of business was sufficient to sustain
venue in that county even though the corporation was not, in
reality, using such county as its place of business."8 The court held
that "a corporation may be sued in the county where its domicile is
designated by its charter, and this regardless of whether it does busi-
ness or maintains an office in such county."' 9 Hawk & Buck thus
decided that a corporation's domicile or residence was the county
designated in its charter as its "place of business."'" By way of dictum
the court indicated that its holding did not fix venue exclusively in
the charter-designated county; the corporation might also be sued
in the county where its principal office was, in fact, located."
There are no general venue provisions in the Texas Business Cor-
poration Act," and the lack of conformity between the act and the
the principal officers thereof may reside .... ." Okla. Star. Ann. tit. 12, § 134 (1960).
Oregon's general venue statute declares: "All other actions or suits shall be commenced
and tried in the county in which the defendants, or one of them, reside or may be found
at the commencement of the action or suit .... ".Ore. Rev. Stat. § 14.080 (1959).
"Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. (1956).
1"An Act Concerning Private Corporations § 6, Texas Acts 1874, at 120, 122, 8 Gam-
mel, Laws of Texas 122, 124 (1898) (Former art. 1304, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925)).
"' The Texas venue statute states the general rule, subject to thirty-four exceptions or
subdivisions, that no person shall be sued out of the county in which he has his "domicile."
Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 1995 (1950). Subdivision 23, entitled "Corporations and
Associations," reads, in part: "Suits against a private corporation . . . may be brought in
the county in which its principal office is situated .... " The statute does not state where
a corporation resides or is domiciled for venue purposes.
Domicile, as used in the Texas venue statute, means residence. Pearson v. West, 97 Tex.
238, 77 S.W. 945 (1904); Brown v. Boulden, 18 Tex. 432 (1857). "It is very generally
held that a corporation . . . has a residence where it conducts its ordinary business."
(Emphasis added.) Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Mangum, 68 Tex. 342, 346 (1887). For a complete
discussion of "domicile" and "residence," see Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex. 407, 241 S.W.2d
136 (1951).
' 164 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
" See Higgins v. Hampshire Prods., 319 Mich. 674, 30 N.W.2d 390 (1948), in which
the Hawk &l Buck case is cited and followed. See also 175 A.L.R. 1083 (1948), where the
Higgins case is reported, and the annotation at 1092.
" 164 S.W.2d at 246.
19 Id. at 247.
20 Ibid.
2' Ibid.
22Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. (1956). The Texas act is patterned after the Model Act.
Introduction, 3A Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. Stat. ix (1956). There are certain important
differences but none are pertinent to the question of venue. For a discussion of the Texas
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Texas venue statute precipitated the problem in the principal case.2"
The venue statute allows suits against corporations to be maintained
in the county in which the corporation has its (1) "domicile"" or
(2) "principal office." 2 The corporation act requires that a corpora-
tion maintain (1) a "registered office" and (2) a "registered agent"
at the registered office." The articles of incorporation must set forth
the post office address of the corporation's initial registered office and
the name of the initial registered agent at such address.27 The act
does not require a corporation to designate the place or places of
business, nor the location of its principal office.
Since the applicable corporate venue provisions were the same in
the principal case as they were in Hawk & Buck,2 the supreme court
had to decide whether the reasoning and result in that case"' would
be applicable to the facts in the principal case, notwithstanding the
change in charter requirements from "place of business" s" to "regis-
tered office."'" The court resolved the problem by ruling that "the
place of its designated registered office and agent shall constitute a
statutory place of residence3 ' of the corporation" 3 and noted that its
construction of the Texas corporation act "comports with the
reasoning of cases illustrated by Hawk and Buck . . . .
changes from the Model Act see Carrington, Experience in Texas With the Model Business
Corporation Act, 5 Utah L. Rev. 292 (1957).
The Texas Act has some specific venue provisions. For involuntary dissolution of a
domestic corporation or the revocation of a foreign corporation's certificate of authority,
the suit "shall be commenced . . . in the district court of the county in which the
registered office ... is situated, or in any district court of Travis County." (Travis County
is the county in which the state capital is located.) Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 7.03
(1956). "The district court for the county in which the registered office of a corporation
is located may order liquidation of the assets and business of the corporation and may ap-
point a receiver to effect such liquidation .... " Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 7.06A
(1956). See note 10 supra for similar provisions in the Model Act.
23 See note 12 supra for examples of other states' handling of the conformity problem.4 Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 1995 (1950).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995, § 23 (1950).
"Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.09 (1956).
2 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 3.02A(10) (1956). The address of the registered office
can be changed inexpensively and with little difficulty by filing with the Secretary of State
a statement of the change. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.10 (1956).
28 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
29 See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
asAn Act Concerning Private Corporations § 6, Texas Acts 1874, at 120, 122, 8
Gammel, Laws of Texas 122, 124 (1898) (Former art. 1304, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925)).
" Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 3.02A(10) (1956).
a The court apparently uses "residence" to mean "domicile." Although the general
venue provision speaks of "domicile," Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995 (1950), the
court refers to "general venue in the county of residence." 364 S.W.2d at 195. This
interchanging of "residence" and "domicile" is in accord with earlier Texas cases. See note
15 supra.
33 364 S.W.2d at 195.
34 Ibid.
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The holding in the principal case can be summarized as follows:
(1) The county which a corporation has designated either in its
original or amended articles of incorporation as the location of its
registered office is, for venue purposes, the statutory residence of
that corporation. (2) Subdivision 23 of the Texas venue statute,3s
which provides that suit may be brought against a corporation in the
county in which its principal office is situated, is an exception to
the general venue rule that suit be brought in the country in which
the corporation has its domicile.36
The question could arise as to whether the "statutory place of
residence" is the only residence of a corporation for purposes of
venue.37 For such a result there would have to be an overruling, by
implication, of prior cases which have considered other possible resi-
dences.3" It is submitted that no overruling was implied by the court
nor intended by the legislature." The Ward case apparently equates
"registered office" under the Texas Business Corporation Act with
"place of business" under the prior corporation statutes, at least
insofar as venue is concerned. As such, the Ward rule merely sup-
plants the Hawk & Buck rule.
The result reached in the principal case is salutary. It provides an
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995 (1950).
" Accordingly, if a corporation designates X county as the location of its registered
office (which, according to the rule announced in (1) above, establishes X county as its
domicile for venue purposes) and if the principal office of the corporation is situated in Y
county, a plaintiff can maintain venue against the corporation in either X county under
the general rule or Y county under the exception.
" The problem as to possible additional residences is brought into sharp focus by con-
sidering subdivision 4 of the Texas venue statute. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995
(1950). This subdivision provides, in part: "If two or more defendants reside in different
counties, suit may be brought in any county where one of the defendants resides." (Em-
phasis added.) Thus, if a plaintiff attempts to apply subdivision 4 to bring several defendants
into the county in which a corporation resides, it is imperative that the residence or resi-
dences of the corporation be known.
The Ward case also involved subdivision 4. The plaintiff attempted to prove that one
of the corporations resided in Navarro County, and, therefore, under subdivision 4, venue
would lie in that county as to the remaining defendants. The Supreme Court ruled on the
residence of the Navarro County corporation and remanded the subdivision 4 question for
further proceedings. 364 S.W.2d at 196.
"SE.g., Pittsburg Water Heater Co. v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417, 282 S.W. 576 (1926);
Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. Schuhart, 115 Tex. 114, 277 S.W. 621 (1925); Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Mangum, 68 Tex. 342, 4 S.W. 617 (1887).
" If the court had intended the "statutory place of residence" to be the only residence
of the corporation, it would have been a simple matter to have said so. However, the court
said that "the place of its designated registered office and agent shall constitute a statutory
place of residence of the corporation .... " 364 S.W.2d at 195. (Emphasis added.) The
court also stated, "As so construed, the Texas Business Corporation Act constitutes a
statutory pronouncement of where a corporation resides for venue purposes which meets
the requirements of decisions illustrated by Pittsburg Water Heater Company of Texas
v. Sullivan .... " Ibid. It is thus the corporation act which provided the statutory residence.
Since there was no change in the venue statute, it is reasonable to assume that prior con-
structions of the venue statute were still in force following passage of the Texas Business
Corporation Act.
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easily ascertainable county in which venue will always lie against a
corporation. No undue burden is imposed upon a corporation, be-
cause it is free to designate any county as the location of its registered
office, and it can easily change such location by complying with
article 2.10 of the Texas Business Corporation Act. Of course, a
corporation is now well advised to choose the site of its registered
office with the idea of venue in mind.
Sam N. Vilches, Jr.
Workmen's Compensation - Longshoremen and
Harbor Workers
Decedent was fatally injured while employed as a workman in
the construction of an oil drilling barge. Although the barge had
been launched, it was still under construction and had never been
used in navigation. Claimant, Decedent's wife, recovered benefits
under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act.' Later, she ob-
tained an award in a federal district court' under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act;' the award was disallowed
by the court of appeals.4 On certiorari' to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed: Federal workmen's compensation is available
to a harbor worker or longshoreman injured while working on the
navigable waters of the United States, regardless of whether the
particular injury is within the constitutional reach of a state work-
men's compensation law. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S.
114 (1962).
In the past, injured longshoremen and harbor workers have been
uncertain whether to apply for state or federal workmen's compen-
'La. Rev. Stat. §§ 23:1021-:1351 (1952).
'Although there is a maximum limit on the compensation award under Louisiana law,
there is none under the federal law. In the instant case the federal award was credited
with the payments made under the state award. This is consistent with the position taken
when an employee obtains a recovery in two different states. In such a case the recovery
is limited to the highest amount the workman should be entitled to receive under the act
most favorable to him. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 97 (3d ed. 1949); 1 Schneider,
Workman's Compensation § 160 (3d ed. 1941). See also Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Price, 300 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App.), error dism. per curiam, 117 Tex. 173, 300 S.W.
672 (1927). The problems of subrogation between various insurance carriers are not within
the scope of this Note.
a 4 4 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 55 901-50 (1958), as amended, 33 U.S.C. 55
907(b)-41 (Supp. III, 1961).
4293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961).
5368 U.S. 946 (1962). "We granted certiorari because of the importance of the inter-
pretation of § 3 (a) in the administration of the act."
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sation. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen," decided in 1916, the United
States Supreme Court held that United States admiralty jurisdic-
tion applied to a case in which a longshoreman was killed while
loading an ocean-going vessel, and that the worker was precluded
from receiving state workmen's compensation." The Court reasoned
that a state workmen's compensation statute could not operate in
any area where it overlapped the United States admiralty jurisdic-
tion.' Because there was no federal workmen's compensation ap-
plicable to longshoremen at that time, the Jensen decision deprived
these workers of the benefits of workmen's compensation. In an
attempt to rectify this situation, Congress enacted legislation9 which
allowed state compensation to longshoremen and harbor workers.
However, the statute was declared unconstitutional in 1920, in
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,"e as being a delegation of a non-
delegable federal power to the states. In 1922 Congress attempted
again to solve the problem left by Jensen by giving to claimants the
rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation laws of any
state.11 This second statute met the same fate as the prior one, and
for the same reason, in Washington v. Dawson & Co.1" In 1927, in
6244 U.S. 205 (1916).
" Id. at 216: "The matter was outside state cognizance and exclusively within federal
maritime jurisdiction since to hold otherwise would impair the harmony and uniformity
which the constitutional grant to the Federal government of the admiralty power was
meant to assure."
'The issues before the Court in the Jensen and Calbeck cases were completely different.
The problem in Jensen concerned the limits of state jurisdiction in admiralty matters-a
constitutional question. In Calbeck, the issue was the limit of federal jurisdiction-a question
of statutory construction (in particular, the construction of § 3(a) of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
9Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395. This act purported to amend the Judicial Code 5S
24, 256 by adding to the saving clause: "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a com-
mon-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it, and to claimants the rights
and remedies vnder the workmen's compensation law of any State." (Emphasis added.)
'0 2 53 U.S. 149 (1920). The fundamental purpose of granting the admiralty power to
Congress was to "preserve adequate harmony and appropriately uniform rules relating to
maritime matters and bring them within the control of the Federal government." The
Court said Congress could not transfer its legislative power to the states. Moreover, such
a delegation of power to the various states would lend nonconformity rather than uni-
formity to the national law.
"1 Act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 634, amended the saving clause of the Judicial Code
55 24, 256 to read: "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where
the common law is competent to give it and to claimants for compensation for injuries to
or death of persons other than the master or members of the crew of a vessel their rights
and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any State, District, Territory, or
posession of the United States ....
12 2 64 U.S. 219 (1924). The concern was with a constitutional provision
which, for the purpose of securing harmony and uniformity, prescribes a set
of rules, empowers Congress to legislate to that end, and prohibits material
interference by the States. Obviously, if every State may freely declare the
rights and liabilities incident to maritime employment, there will at once arise
the confusion and uncertainty which framers of the Constitution both foresaw
and sought to prevent. Id. at 226.
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accordance with Justice McReynolds' suggestion in Dawson" that
the enactment of federal workmen's compensation legislation would
be within its powers, Congress passed the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.'
The Longshoremen's Act has several features which limit the
scope of its application. It covers only those injuries incurred on the
navigable waters of the United States." It does not cover (1) masters
or members of a crew nor (2) officers or employees of the United
States." Its most restrictive provision is that federal compensation
is available only when compensation cannot be validly provided by
a state statute.
Although the new act covered many persons not previously pro-
tected, the problem of determining whether to apply for state or
federal compensation remained." If the claimant chose the wrong
forum, his payments would be delayed, or possibly, if too much time
was wasted, completely barred by the statute of limitations." The
dilemma was partially abridged in a line of Supreme Court decisions"
in which state compensation was allowed for injuries sustained
within the area covered by the federal admiralty laws. The reason
given by the Court was that, although the employment was maritime
in character, it was of purely local concern, and recovery under state
law would not prejudice the uniformity of the national law.2" How-
ever, the Court did not define the limits of this "maritime but local"
theory. One example of the doctrine is found in the leading case of
"I1d. at 227-28:
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime
law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This
power, we think, would permit enactment of a general employers' liability law
or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be
delegated to the several States. . . . The subject is national. Local interests
must yield to the common welfare. The Constitution is supreme.
1444 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §
907(b)-41 (Supp. III, 1961).
" Dry docks are included in the coverage of the act as part of the navigable waters
of the United States.
"SMasters and members of a crew are covered by the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958), and officers and employees of the United States by the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45
U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
17 See 46 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 618 (1933); 29 Mich. L. Rev. 600, 603 (1931); 5 Tul.
L. Rev. 123 (1930).
" Levinson v. Dupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953).
"9 Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Western Fuel Co. v.
Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263
(1922); Millers' Indem. Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926).
'0"[T]he cause was controlled by the principle, that as to certain local matters regula-
tion of which would work no material prejudice to the general maritime law, the rules of
the latter may be modified or supplemented by state statutes." Miller's Indem. Underwriters
v. Braud, supra note 19, at 64.
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Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode,2 where state compensation
was allowed because the employment (bridge building) was "local in
nature" and because the parties had contracted with reference to
the state law.
There was no significant change in the law from the ruling in
Jensen," with the exception of the occasional inroads based on the
"maritime but local" theory, until the case of Davis v. Department
of Labor & Indus."s in 1942. In that case, Justice Black, writing for
the majority, proposed that in those instances when it was difficult
to determine whether a state or the federal act was applicable, re-
covery could be allowed under either. Referring to this vague area
as a "twilight zone,"'" the Court said its holding was designed to
alleviate the problem inherent in the waterfront cases where a reason-
able argument could be made for either federal or state jurisdiction.25
However, because of its very nature it was impossible to set definite
limits to the "twilight zone," and until the present, cases clearly
within the United States admiralty jurisdiction were not considered
within the "twilight zone."'"
In the instant case, Justice Brennen, speaking for the majority,
first analyzed the situation that existed when the federal act was
passed." He concluded that the legislature had been faced with a
two-fold problem: (1) There were many persons to whom no work-
men's compensation was available as a result of the Jensen case,"
and (2) the two previous attempts to give coverage to these people
"257 U.S. 469 (1922).
2 For examples of cases that came after the Rhode case, but which reiterated the prin-
ciple announced in Jensen, see Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1931).
23 3 17 U.S. 249 (1942).
24',There is, in the light of the cases referred to, clearly a twilight zone in which the
employees must have their rights determined case by case, and in which particular facts
and circumstances are vital elements." Id. at 256. Other than this brief explanation, Justice
Black did not further define the "twilight zone."
2"See Moore's Case, 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948), aff'd, 335 U.S. 874 (1948),
in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that the Davis case should be regarded as
a revolutionary decision deemed necessary to escape an intolerable situation
and . . . designed to include . . . all waterfront cases involving aspects per-
taining both to the land and to the sea where a reasonable argument can be
made either way, even though a careful examination of numerous previous
decisions might disclose an apparent weight of authority one way or the other.
Id. at 164.
Although ambiguous, in that it allows concurrent jurisdiction of two statutes which
purport to be mutually exclusive, the "twilight zone" theory was only employed in cases
in which the validity of the state award was challenged.
"°See, e.g., Avondale Marine Ways v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953).
27 370 U.S. at 117: "The Congress which enacted it [the Longshoremen's Act] would
have preferred to leave to state compensation laws the matter of injuries sustained by
employees on navigable waters within state boundaries."
21 Id. at 118: "The Jensen decision deprived many thousands of employees of the bene-
fits of workmen's compensation."
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had been declared unconstitutional.29 The Court placed more emphasis
upon the problems which Congress had faced and upon what the
Court construed the intention of Congress to have been in passing
the act, than upon the language of the act itself. Thus, even though
the act provides that federal compensation shall be payable only if
recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by state law,"0 and in the
instant case, state compensation had already been received, the Court
permitted recovery. The Court stated that Congress would have
passed a more comprehensive act but for the unfavorable treatment
given prior legislation. According to the Court, the "Longshoremen's
Act was designed to ensure that a compensation remedy existed for
all injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters,"'" and there-
fore, "in the application of the Act, the broadest ground it permits
of should be taken."3 The Court allowed the compensation award on
the theory that it was within Congress' desire to extend coverage to
people excluded by the Jensen case."'
A vigorous dissent34 condemned the majority's line of reasoning,
arguing that "the Court concludes that Congress did not mean what
it said." 5 The dissent seriously doubted "whether statutory language
as clear as that in . . . the statute could ever be ignored in the name
of effectuating the supposed 'congressional desire.' ,.. The dissenting
justices stated that they could not ignore the statutory requisite of
the act,37 viz, that federal compensation cannot be given unless work-
men's compensation proceedings cannot validly be provided by
state law.
29 "This court struck down both statutes as unconstitutional delegations to the states
of the legislative power of congress, and as tending to defeat the purpose of the Constitution
to achieve harmony and uniformity to the maritime law." Ibid.
" It has been unequivocally recognized that recovery for those employed on new ship
construction for disability or death through workmen's compensation may validly be pro-
vided by state law. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
3' 370 U.S. at 124.32 1d. at 130.
" Because there was no federal workmen's compensation available to those excluded
from state benefits by Jensen, those people found themselves with no workmen's compensa-
tion.





7 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50
(1958), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 907(b)-41 (Supp. III, 1961). Section 3(a) provides
that "compensation shall be payable . . . in respect of disability or death of an employee,
but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable
waters of the United States (including dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or




Although the reasoning of the Court and the wording of the act
are incompatible, the result reached is a desirable one for several
reasons. It should promote the long sought condition of uniformity
in the national law. In essence the Court's decision removes the re-
quirement that federal compensation is available only in cases where
state compensation cannot be given. Every longshoreman and harbor
worker injured on the navigable waters of the United States should
now be assured of a right to federal compensation." More important,
the injured employee is guaranteed a forum which will take juris-
diction and hear his claim. 9 Much of the confusion surrounding the
choice of forums has been dissipated.
One question left unanswered by the Court is whether state juris-
diction is to be limited in those cases which are on the border line
between state and federal authority." Under the "twilight zone"
theory, there is concurrent state and federal jurisdiction in that area
where reasonable argument could be made either way.4' Because of
this, state awards in a situation within the area of federal jurisdiction
were not overruled. Since enlarged federal jurisdiction is now offered,
there is no longer any need for a "twilight zone," and consequently,
no need to allow state intervention on the fringe of federal juris-
diction."
In the instant case the Court was concerned only with the prob-
lem which plagued longshoremen and harbor workers when they
had to choose the correct forum in which to apply for workmen's
compensation. If the Court extends its reasoning to related cases,
it can make clear forum problems that have bothered other groups
of workers. There is doubt, for example, whether the remedy of a
as The increased uniformity exists because federal jurisdiction is assured in cases in
which it might previously have been denied on the ground that state compensation could
be validly given.
39 Now that claims by longshoremen for federal compensation are secure on jurisdictional
grounds, no longer need the claimant fear that his award will be delayed or barred by the
statute of limitations because he chose the wrong forum.
40 That is, whether, in those situations where state compensation is higher than federal
compensation, the injured employee may apply for state compensation after he has received
a federal award. It has been held that an award of state compensation is not a bar to a
federal award, but the federal award will be credited by the amount of state compensation
given. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 149 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1945). If this
practice is allowed, an injured employee may apply for federal compensation secure in the
knowledge that he will not be defeated on jurisdictional grounds. After he obtains the
federal award he can later attempt to obtain higher compensation by applying to the state.
" The injured workman in these cases does not face the problem of taking inconsistent
judicial positions in the state and federal court. The Court's holding that the injury occurred
on the navigable water of the United States is consistent with both state and federal juris-
diction.
" It does not seem reasonable that the Court will use such reasoning to limit state




railroad employee injured while loading or unloading freight cars
from floats and barges is provided by the Longshoremen's Act" or
the Federal Employer's Liability Act." Another unsettled question
concerns the determination whether a person is or is not a master
or a member of a crew." A third area of conflict arises in cases in
which the limits of a dry dock must be determined." The "twilight
zone" theory has never been applied to any of these three areas;
however, that fact should not bar the Court from applying the
reasoning of the instant case. 7 In each of the three situations, the
litigant's success hinges upon a fortunate selection of forums. This
is the same problem which until now had plagued longshoremen and
harbor workers who had to choose between a state or federal court.
The Calbeck case should be a guide for seeking federal compensation
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
in all three of the areas mentioned.
Blair Rugh
4344 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901-50 (1958), as amended, 33 U.S.C. 55
907(b)-41 (Supp. III, 1961).
4435 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
The problem in these cases is whether the person is in maritime employment or in railroading
activity. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953). If the injury
occurs on the navigable water (or dry dock) the instant case would be precedent for an
award of compensation under the Longshoremen's Act regardless of the type of activity.
4 See Desper, Adm'rx v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952); Norton v.
Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944). The problem in these situations is whether the person's
occupation is classified as longshoreman or harbor worker, or as a master or a member of
a crew. Regardless of the classification, the instant case would be precedent for expanding
the scope of the Longshoremen's Act to cover both groups. It is more difficult to extend
the Court's reasoning into the area of master and crew, as they specificially were excluded
from the statutes prior to the Longshoremen's Act. See note 16 supra. Also, when the
Longshoremen's Act was passed, these workers lobbied against inclusion in order that they
could save their remedies under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1958).
4 See Avondale Marine Ways v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953); Cope v. Vallette Dry
Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Branham, 136 F.2d 873 (4th Cir.
1943); Continental Cas. Co. v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1933).
" The "maritime but local" theory has not been used in these areas because it is relevant
only when the jurisdictional conflict is between a state and the federal act. The above
named situations all concern conflicts between two federal acts.
